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Individuals with public speaking phobia experience fear and avoidance that can 
cause extreme distress, impaired speaking performance, and associated problems in 
psychosocial functioning. Most extant interventions for public speaking phobia tend to 
focus on the reduction of anxiety and avoidance, but neglect performance. Additionally, 
very little is known about the neurophysiological mechanisms responsible for social 
performance under conditions of high anxiety. The current study compared the efficacy 
of two cognitive behavioral treatments (standard Beckian Cognitive Behavioral Therapy 
(CT) versus an acceptance-based behavior therapy called Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy (ACT)) in enhancing public speaking performance and coping with anxiety. 
Secondarily, brain activation was measured to explore the relationships between 
treatment type, anxiety, performance, and prefrontal brain oxygenation. Individuals 
(n=19) with high public speaking anxiety were randomized to a 90-minute ACT or CT 
intervention. Assessments took place at pre- and post-treatment and included self-rated 
and objective anxiety measures, a behavioral assessment, ACT and CT process measures, 
and functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) readings. Results indicated that 
participants in the ACT condition experienced greater improvements in observer-rated 
performance in comparison to those in the CT condition. Individuals in the ACT 
condition exhibited greater reductions in oxygenated hemoglobin in the right dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex following the intervention than those in the CT condition. Furthermore, 
	  vii	  
blood volume decreased in the ACT condition and increased in the CT condition between 
pre- and post-treatment assessments. These results suggest that ACT may have a superior 
performance effect in this population, and that these two treatment modalities have 
different effects in the brain. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Although feeling anxious while speaking in public is a normal occurrence (Harris, 
Kemmerling, & North, 2002; Stein, Walker, & Forde, 1996), a subset of the population 
experiences severe and incapacitating anxiety in these situations (Grant, et al., 2005). In 
fact, approximately 21% of individuals with social anxiety disorder (SAD; also referred 
to as social phobia) have clinically significant public speaking anxiety but do not 
experience marked anxiety in other social situations. These individuals have “public 
speaking anxiety”. Oftentimes speech performance is significantly degraded as a result of 
this extreme anxiety (Daly, Vangelisti, & Lawrence, 1989). As a result, these individuals 
tend to report social and occupational dysfunction and dissatisfaction (Stein, et al., 1996). 
Public speaking anxiety is often researched in a mixed SAD sample, which 
includes individuals with generalized SAD or other specific social fears. However, there 
is growing evidence that public speaking phobia is qualitatively distinct from other SAD 
subtypes. As a result, the current research on the phenomenology, psychopathology, and 
treatment response in SAD may not be applicable to individuals with clinically 
significant public speaking anxiety. Because these individuals suffer from significant 
distress and performance deficits, it is important to determine which treatments are most 
effective specifically for this population. 
To date, treatment outcome research in public speaking phobia has focused 
primarily on reducing subjective anxiety. The impact of current treatments on public 
speaking performance has not received significant attention, and protocols that do 
examine behavioral performance typically employ inadequate performance 
measurements. Because individuals with public speaking anxiety tend to give poorer 
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speech performances than controls (Hofmann, Gerlach, Wender, & Roth, 1997; Lewin, 
McNeil, & Lipson, 1996) it is critical to determine whether currently available treatments 
improve performance deficits. As such, this study aims to investigate the performance-
enhancing capabilities of two distinct cognitive-behavioral interventions in a public 
speaking phobic sample. 
Additionally, we examined the relationship between anxiety, performance, and 
brain oxygenation. We are particularly interested in whether the two treatments are 
associated with different changes in oxygenation within the brain. Continued 
investigation into the neurological correlates of public speaking anxiety and its treatment 
may help explain why some individuals experience significant anxiety in public speaking 
situations, and provide a better understanding of the brain mechanisms associated with 
speech anxiety. Furthermore, we can explore whether two putatively distinct cognitive-
behavioral interventions (ACT and CT) show differential patterns of brain arousal, and 
the possibility that baseline brain patterns might predict differential response to these two 
interventions. 
1.1 Social Anxiety Disorder 
SAD is estimated to have a lifetime prevalence of up to 12.1% (Ruscio, et al., 
2008). It is the fourth-most common psychiatric disorder in the United States after 
specific phobia, depression, and substance abuse (Kessler, et al., 2005). The current 
diagnostic criteria for SAD require excessive fears of being embarrassed and negatively 
evaluated by others in social situations (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 
2000). Feared social scenarios generally include informal and formal social events, 
performance situations, initiating and maintaining conversations, and being assertive 
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(Grant, et al., 2005). As physiological symptoms often accompany these fears (Klinger, et 
al., 2005), many individuals with SAD worry that others can see that they are anxious.  
Individuals diagnosed with SAD either avoid the social situations that they fear, 
or they participate while enduring severe anxiety (Herbert & Dalrymple, 2005; Turk, 
Heimberg, & Hope, 2001). As a result, individuals experience significant impairment in 
both social and occupational settings (Stein, et al., 1996). SAD is also associated with a 
lower quality of life, impaired productivity level, and decreased satisfaction with personal 
relationships when compared to individuals without SAD (Lipsitz & Schneier, 2000). 
The 2001-2002 National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions 
(NESARC) reported that 93% of persons with SAD report significant distress, with 
62.4% acknowledging interpersonal or occupational dysfunction (Grant, et al., 2005). 
SAD is often co-morbid with other psychiatric disorders. Almost 50% of 
individuals with SAD have another anxiety disorder; other common co-morbid diagnoses 
include bipolar I, alcohol abuse or dependence, and avoidant and dependent personality 
disorders (Grant, et al., 2005) Herbert, 2007). The emergence of SAD in adolescence 
typically occurs prior to the development of the comorbid disorder (Dalrymple, Herbert 
& Gaudiano, 2007; Kessler, Stein, & Berglund, 1998). 
Given the nature of the feared situations in SAD, many individuals with the 
illness do not seek treatment (Stein & Chavira, 1998). The NESARC findings indicate 
that approximately 80% of individuals never receive treatment, in contrast to 50% of 
people with generalized anxiety disorder and 40% of people with major depressive 
disorder (Grant, et al., 2005). 
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The DSM-IV-TR distinguishes between two subtypes of SAD: generalized and 
non-generalized (e.g. specific). Approximately 82% of people with SAD have 
generalized SAD (Grant, et al., 2005), which is defined by a fear of most social situations. 
A diagnosis of non-generalized SAD is appropriate when an individual fears only a few 
social situations, the most common being performance-based situations such as public 
speaking. 
1.2 Public Speaking Anxiety 
Speaking in public is a vital component of many occupational and educational 
settings. A large proportion of the population (estimates range from 34% to 85%) 
experience anxiety during speaking performances. This anxiety can be extremely difficult 
to manage (Motley, 1995; Stein, et al., 1996), and often interferes with the ability to focus, 
think clearly, read notes, form sentences, and utter speech with proper volume and diction. 
Furthermore, public speaking anxiety is correlated with unemployment and lower income 
(Motley, 1995). Although some cases of public speaking phobia are not debilitating, the 
associated fear and avoidance usually cause intense distress and significant disruption in 
social, academic, and occupational functioning. When speech anxiety is severe and 
clinically significant, and the individual does not experience anxiety in any other social 
situations, they are classified as having public speaking anxiety. Because public speaking 
anxiety can have such a significant impact on life satisfaction and functioning, continued 
research on this population is critical. 
1.2.1. Public Speaking Anxiety as a Distinct Subtype of SAD. Recent research on 
social anxiety has investigated potential subtypes within the SAD spectrum. This research 
has empirically identified performance anxiety as a distinct subtype of SAD, and has 
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found key physiological and behavioral characteristics unique to a performance anxiety 
subtype. As such, the majority of research on SAD, which uses mixed samples, may not 
be generalizable to public speaking phobics.  
Eng et al. (2000) gave the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS; Liebowitz, 
1987) to 382 individuals with SAD. Using a cluster analysis, the authors found three 
distinct symptom subtypes: Pervasive Social Anxiety (similar to a generalized subtype), 
Moderate Social Interaction Anxiety, and Dominant Public Speaking Anxiety. Furmark, 
Tillfors, Stattin, Ekselius and Fredrikson (2000) distributed a questionnaire to 2000 
individuals in Sweden. This survey contained diagnostic questions from the DSM-IV, 
items from the Social Phobia Scale (SPS; Heimberg et al, 1992) and the Social 
Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998), and various questions 
selected from other descriptive and diagnostic interviews. The authors performed a 
hierarchical cluster analysis on 188 respondents who qualified for a diagnosis of SAD. 
This analysis generated three factors similar to Eng’s results: high SAD (which they 
called a generalized subtype), intermediate SAD (a non-generalized, moderate subtype) 
or low (a discrete, or specific subtype – most commonly performance anxiety). Taken 
together, these studies indicate that specific social anxieties, like public speaking anxiety, 
are distinct from generalized social phobia. 
Other research has focused on comparing the physiological characteristics, 
comorbidity profiles, and developmental features of different social phobia subtypes. 
Multiple studies have demonstrated that individuals with generalized SAD (who also fear 
public speaking) exhibit different physiological responses during a speech performance 
task than public speaking phobics. Heart rate in the generalized SAD condition increased 
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slowly at the beginning of the task and steadily returned to baseline. However, 
individuals who only feared public speaking experienced a spike in heart rate at the 
beginning of the task and returned to baseline more quickly (Heimberg, Hope, Dodge, & 
Becker, 1990; Hofmann, Ehlers, Newman, & Roth, 1995; Levin, et al., 1993). 
Researchers hypothesize that these physiological differences may reflect disparities in the 
experience of anxiety between subtypes (e.g. generalized social phobics are more 
resigned to an impaired performance).  
Further support for physiological differences between subtypes comes from 
research reporting that performance phobic patients demonstrate greater autonomic 
arousal and anticipatory anxiety than generalized social phobics, but significantly less 
self-reported anxiety during speaking tasks (Levin, et al., 1993). These results add 
support to the assertion that public speaking anxiety is a qualitatively distinct subtype 
relative to generalized SAD, and not simply a less severe variant. 
Heimberg, Holt and Schneider (2003) conducted a meta-analysis investigating the 
validity of a distinctive performance anxiety subtype (most commonly, public speaking) 
in SAD. According to the 16 studies that were analyzed, performance anxiety is less 
likely to be genetically inherited, has a later onset of symptoms, and is more likely to be 
responsive to treatment with beta-blockers than generalized SAD. The authors concluded 
that performance anxiety is a distinct type of SAD that should be included as a unique 
specifier in future APA diagnostic manuals (Heimberg et al., 2009).  
These studies represent the growing set of research that identifies a distinction 
between a more generalized subtype of SAD and public speaking anxiety. In response, 
the DSM-5 Anxiety Disorders Revision Committee has proposed the inclusion of a 
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specifier for “performance only” -based anxiety if fears are restricted to public speaking 
or other forms of behavioral performance (American Psychiatric Association, 2010). This 
action by the APA underscores the conclusion that public speaking anxiety is an entity 
separate from generalized social phobia.  
Research must distinguish clinically significant public speaking phobia from the 
larger pool of individuals with SAD.  Results of treatment outcome studies are of 
particular concern, as evidence of differences in the subjective experience of anxiety 
between conditions may impact treatment needs. It is critical that we examine public 
speaking anxiety separately from other types of social phobia to establish the efficacy of 
treatments for this population. 
Studies that report differences in subjective anxiety and physiological response 
among individuals with SAD support the conclusion that the two identified categories of 
SAD (generalized vs. specific/discrete) represent valid subtypes. Therefore, it is 
important to distinguish these subtypes in studies of the larger phenomenon of SAD.  
Homogeneous samples composed of public speaking phobics improve our ability to 
observe changes in performance, anxiety, and brain activation associated with the 
treatment of this population. The research reviewed above not only provides support for 
the examination of public speaking anxiety as an entity separate from generalized SAD, 
but also explains our rationale for selecting public speaking phobia (the most common 
variant of specific SAD) rather than also including generalized SAD in our sample. 
1.2.2. Performance Deficits. Although multiple studies have reported poor social 
performance in individuals in SAD (Beidel, Turner, & Dancu, 1985; Stopa & Clark, 
1993; Twentyman & McFall, 1975), there is surprisingly little information on speech 
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performance deficits in public speaking phobics. Furthermore, the majority of speech 
performance data that does exist has been collected using self-report measures. As 
individuals are generally inaccurate in self-appraisals of performance (Campbell & Lee, 
1988), the validity of these data is unclear. However, a small number of studies have used 
objective measurements and provide preliminary evidence of noteworthy speech 
performance deficits in speech phobia. 
Hoffman, et al. (1997) investigated speech performance in 14 individuals with 
public speaking anxiety. Compared to controls, participants with public speaking anxiety 
paused more frequently and for a longer duration. They also used a greater number of 
“ah”-like utterances as rated by objective observes. These results replicated those of a 
previous study (Lewin, McNeil, & Lipson, 1996). Furthermore, individuals with public 
speaking anxiety tended to avoid eye contact with the audience more than non-anxious 
participants during a speech task (Eves & Marks, 1991). Eye contact and speech fluency 
are both critical public speaking skills. A lack of eye contact and lengthy pauses can 
impair performance significantly (Daley, 1978). This research supports the relationship 
between public speaking anxiety and associated speech performance deficits. 
1.3 Cognitive-Behavioral Treatments for Public Speaking Anxiety 
Cognitive-behavioral treatments (CBT) are empirically established treatments for 
SAD. These treatments can be employed in both individual and group formats for SAD, 
as research indicates that methods produce equivalent results (Rodebaugh, Holaway, & 
Heimberg, 2004). A recent meta-analysis of 24 studies reported a large mean effect size 
(ES = .74) of standard cognitive behavioral treatments for SAD, with exposure-alone and 
exposure combined with standard CBT as the most effective (Gould, Buckminster, 
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Pollack, Otto, & Yap, 1997). Despite this encouraging evidence for the efficacy of 
cognitive-behavioral treatments, these studies primarily used a mixed-SAD sample and 
most did not report objective speech performance data. As a result, the benefits of these 
treatments for individuals with public speaking anxiety and their impact on speech 
performance remain unclear.  
1.3.1. Standard Cognitive-Behavioral Treatments (CBT). There are multiple 
cognitive-behavioral treatments available for SAD. CBT treatments typically employ 
both behavioral exposure and cognitive restructuring techniques. Although CBT is a 
broad term that encompasses a large number of therapeutic approaches (Forman & 
Herbert, 2009), traditional Beckian Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CT), which 
emphasizes the identification and restructuring of distorted or dysfunctional cognitions, 
has received the most attention for SAD. For example, individuals with public speaking 
anxiety are taught to identify thoughts and underlying beliefs that trigger emotional 
reactions (e. g., "I’ll go blank in the middle of my speech and everyone will think I’m 
stupid"), and then replace these cognitions with more accurate, functional thoughts. 
Negative self-evaluative thoughts and overestimations of the probability of negative 
outcomes are also targets of reappraisal. Exposure methods are included to target 
behavioral avoidance, and are a means of testing the validity of dysfunctional and 
irrational cognitions. 
A large body of research supports the efficacy of CT for mood and anxiety 
disorders, and for SAD in particular (Beck, 2005). CT is currently considered the gold 
standard psychotherapeutic treatment for mood and anxiety disorders. Current treatment 
techniques do not generally distinguish between the generalized and non-generalized 
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subtypes, and most treatment outcome studies have incorporated samples that include 
both generalized and speech-phobic individuals.  
Cognitive-behavioral group therapy (CBGT; Heimberg, 1991; Heimberg & 
Becker, 2002) has received significant attention for the treatment of SAD. CBGT uses a 
combination of in-session exposures (involving role plays with confederates and social 
encounters with the public), in-vivo exposure homework, and standard cognitive therapy 
techniques to decrease anxiety in individuals with SAD (Heimberg & Becker, 2002). 
Through exposure to feared stimuli, individuals work to restructure their negative, 
irrational thoughts and habituate to their anxious emotional and physical states. By 
replacing dysfunctional thoughts with functional cognitions, individuals are able to 
control and decrease their anxiety. A large randomized controlled clinical trial reported 
that 75% of CGBT completers with SAD responded to treatment (Heimberg, et al., 1998). 
Other studies have replicated these results (Heimberg, et al., 1998; Heimberg, Salzman, 
Holt, & Blendell, 1993; Herbert, et al., 2005; Liebowitz, et al., 1999).  
Although CT is successful in reducing anxiety in social situations, there are 
concerns about the specific efficacy of the cognitive component of this intervention. CT 
for SAD holds anxiety reduction as a primary aim, and its cognitive restructuring focuses 
on controlling and altering anxious thoughts. However, recent research suggests that 
these goals could be problematic. In fact, direct efforts to control anxiety can often 
paradoxically increase its intensity (Barlow, 2004). Moreover, many “relaxation” 
strategies have paradoxical effects and can actually increase subjective levels of anxiety 
(Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996). In addition, strategies that aim to 
control anxiety (including cognitive restructuring) can tax cognitive resources to the point 
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that they may reduce an individual’s ability to maximally attend to and perform at other 
tasks, such as giving a speech (Hayes, et al., 1996).  
Furthermore, although a few older studies have reported that CT with exposure 
yields greater benefits than exposure alone (Butler, Cullington, Munby, Amies, & Gelder, 
1984), more recent studies in SAD indicate that there is no difference between treatment 
outcomes in these two conditions (Hofmann, 2004; Salaberria & Echeburua, 1998; 
Scholing & Emmelkamp, 1996). Mediational analyses have also failed to support the 
added benefit of CT techniques (Longmore & Worrell, 2007). 
In sum, CT appears to moderately improve speech anxiety in individuals 
diagnosed with SAD.  However, the impact of CT interventions on performance is still 
unclear and will be discussed in detail below. 
1.3.2. Acceptance-based behavior therapies (ABBT). In part because effectiveness 
ceilings appear to have been reached for many CT protocols and in part for theoretical 
reasons, a number of new varieties of CBT have been developed. Of these new treatments, 
acceptance-based behavior therapies (ABBT) show particular promise. A mounting base 
of evidence supports the utility of these approaches in the treatment of many psychiatric 
conditions, with especially good outcomes for anxiety disorders (Eifert, Forsyth, & Hayes, 
2005).  
Although ABBT and CT are treatment models that fall under the broad CBT 
umbrella, they have both overlapping and distinctive qualities. The primary distinction 
between ABBT and CT is that while the latter uses cognitive disputation and exposure to 
achieve symptom relief, ABBT promotes a mindful acceptance of whatever thoughts or 
feelings arise, while continuing to pursue specific behavioral aims. There are multiple 
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types of ABBT, including dialectical behavior therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993), 
mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT; Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002), and 
mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR). However, the most researched ABBT is 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). ACT, 
like CT, is both cognitive and behavioral in nature. Although CT is effective for treating 
anxiety disorders, there are many individuals who do not respond to this therapeutic 
intervention. As there is evidence that ACT may be as effective as CT for anxiety 
(Dalrymple & Herbert, 2007), it is logical to continue studies on the efficacy of this 
treatment to determine how it can enhance the battery of treatment options currently 
available. A key aim of this study is to compare a brief ACT-based treatment to CT for 
the treatment of public speaking anxiety. 
As with ABBTs in general, ACT moves beyond symptom reduction and 
emphasizes engagement in desired behaviors while mindfully accepting distressing 
thoughts and sensations (Hayes, et al., 1999). ACT incorporates cognitive defusion (the 
ability to observe one’s subjective experiences, particularly cognitive or verbal 
components, from a distance and as distinct from the self), acceptance (being willing to 
tolerate internal experiences without struggling with them), and values clarification 
(articulating what is most important to an individual; see Hayes, et al., 1999). Exposure 
techniques, complemented by practice in the mindfulness-enhancing strategies of 
defusion and psychological acceptance, may help the patient view anxiety as less 
threatening and can diminish the relationship between thoughts and behavior. Patients are 
taught to give up their attempts to control, suppress or avoid their anxiety, and instead to 
focus their attention on engaging in valued behavior (for example, giving an important 
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speech).  
The scientific literature on ACT has expanded rapidly over the past decade, with 
recent research indicating that ACT is at least as effective as CT, and appears to operate 
through distinctive treatment mechanisms (Forman, Herbert, Moitra, Yeomans, & Geller, 
2007; Hayes, 2008; Powers, Zum Vörde Sive Vörding, & Emmelkamp, 2009). Recent 
meta-analyses indicate that ACT is either comparable or more effective than CT for a 
variety of psychological conditions. Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda and Lillis (2006) 
found that ACT was superior to comparable interventions in their analysis of 12 
randomized controlled trials. They found a large effect after treatment (d = 0.99) and a 
moderate effect at follow-up (d = .72) when ACT was compared to wait list, placebo, or 
treatment as usual. A later meta-analysis obtained moderate effect sizes for ACT’s 
superiority to established treatments, but concluded that the relatively low quantity and 
methodological quality of extant studies reduced confidence in results (Öst, 2008; though 
see Gaudiano, 2009).  
Another review by Powers, Zum Vörde Sive Vörding and Emmelkamp (2009) 
reported that ACT was as effective as current evidence-based treatments (like CT), and 
superior to waitlist controls, placebo groups, and treatment as usual. Although the 
researchers who executed many of the reviewed studies had allegiances to the ACT 
model, these results nevertheless provide preliminary support for the efficacy of ACT 
interventions across different psychological conditions. 
In terms of anxiety, ACT has shown good outcomes with a variety of disorders 
including Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD; Roemer & Orsillo, 2002), Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorder (OCD; Twohig, Hayes, & Masuda, 2006), skin picking (Twohig, 
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Hayes, & Masuda, 2011) and trichotillomania when used with habit reversal techniques 
(Twohig & Woods, 2004).  
Few studies to date have examined ACT for generalized SAD. Dalrymple and 
Herbert (2007) reported an effect size of d = 1.00 for pre- to post-ACT treatment 
improvement in a socially anxious sample, and an effect size of d = 1.20 from pre-ACT 
treatment to follow-up in the same sample. These effect sizes are equivalent to those 
reported for CT treatment in socially anxious populations. An uncontrolled 10-session 
ACT group treatment for SAD showed improvement in social anxiety and experiential 
avoidance, though it was a small study (n=22; Ossman, Wilson, Storaasli & McNeill, 
2006). Golden, Ramel and Gross (2009) found that individuals who completed an eight-
week Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (a different type of ABBT) showed increased 
self-esteem, decreased anxiety, and increased positive and decreased negative self-
endorsement. 
Only a few studies have investigated ACT outcomes in public speaking phobics. 
Block and Wulfert (2000) quasi-randomly assigned speech anxious undergraduates 
(n=11) to ACT group therapy, CGBT, or waitlist control for 4 weeks of treatment. 
Anxiety decreased and willingness increased in both active conditions when compared to 
placebo. However, the small sample size makes it difficult to draw reliable conclusions. 
Another study recruited a somewhat larger (but still quite small) sample of 
undergraduates (n=39) and incorporated the same treatment procedures and conditions as 
their previous protocol. In this study, the ACT and CBGT groups also exhibited 
decreased anxiety and willingness when compared to the no-treatment condition (Block, 
2003). When compared to CBGT, ACT participants endured a post-treatment behavioral 
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exposure task for a longer period of time, indicating that the ACT group experienced a 
significantly greater decrease in avoidance of public speaking relative to the CT condition. 
England (2010) compared group exposure therapy using an acceptance and 
defusion context to group exposure therapy with a habituation-based rationale for the 
treatment of public speaking anxiety. After 6 weekly sessions, there were no differences 
found between the treatment groups, indicating that the ACT context was as effective as 
habituation. All participants improved on outcome measures of public speaking anxiety 
and speech performance (England, 2010). 
Continued examination of the efficacy of ABBT, and ACT in particular, for the 
treatment of public speaking anxiety is needed to explore the value of these approaches in 
treating public speaking phobia. 
1.3.4. Cognitive Behavioral Treatments and Speech Performance. The studies 
reviewed above support the efficacy of cognitive behavioral interventions for SAD. 
However, the impact of these interventions on improving social performance has not 
been adequately investigated. Studies that do investigate social performance typically use 
inadequate measurement techniques, often relying on self-report measures of anxiety, 
perceived performance, and behavioral avoidance. These ratings are unlikely to be 
accurate measures of true performance. Treatment outcome research that objectively 
examines speech performance will clarify the impact of public speaking anxiety 
interventions, and will help determine whether specific cognitive techniques are more 
effective than others in improving performance. 
A few studies have explored the performance enhancement qualities of CT, which 
combines traditional cognitive techniques and exposure. Hope, Heimberg and Bruch, 
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(1995) incorporated a group CT condition (CBGT), and targeted generalized social 
interaction fears. After 12 weeks, individuals in the CBGT condition also experienced 
significant objectively-rated improvement during an anxiety-provoking social role-play 
when compared to wait-list controls (Hope, Heimberg, & Bruch, 1995).  
Mattick, Peters and Clarke (1989) also investigated a group CT treatment for 
public speaking anxiety in individuals with mixed-type SAD. Combined treatment 
increased public speaking performance on a behavioral assessment test following 6 
weeks of therapy, and these performance improvements were maintained at 3-month 
follow-up. Improvements seen in combined therapy were greater at both post-treatment 
and follow-up (Mattick, Peters, & Clarke, 1989).   
While several studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of CT, these treatments 
are not effective for everyone with SAD. Although there has not been a meta-analysis on 
performance change, a recent meta-analysis on general treatment outcomes reported 
noteworthy dropout rates for CT and exposure treatments (10.3% and 12.6%, 
respectively; Gould, et al., 1997). This statistic alone indicates that there is a significant 
percentage of individuals who are not staying in therapy long enough to experience full 
benefit. Furthermore, only 52% of individuals in the CT condition of Mattick and Peter’s 
study were able to speak for the entirety of the speech task, indicating that only half of 
the group were able to give a high-quality performance (Mattick & Peters, 1988). 
Because CT isn’t always effective in improving performance, there is a need for new 
treatments that can maximize the overall efficacy of treatments available. 
Proponents of ACT hypothesize that the cognitive techniques utilized in this 
treatment model may be especially suited for enhancing speech performance.  By 
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teaching individuals how to co-exist with anxiety (and other distressing experiences) 
without defense or struggle, they do not need to expend cognitive resources on 
suppressing their anxiety about giving a speech. As a result, ACT may theoretically free 
up resources for engaging behaviors related to enhancing performance (e.g., 
concentrating on their speech volume, diction, vocabulary, or clarity). Thus, it could be 
hypothesized that ACT is more effective than CT at improving cognitive and motor 
performance in high anxiety situations. These assertions are supported by evidence that 
two aspects of working memory, verbal output and verbal rehearsal, can interfere with 
each other and impact verbal performance (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Calvo & Eysenck, 
1996). These findings provide preliminary evidence that verbally outputting information 
(in speech) while simultaneously rehearsing CT control strategies may actually impact 
performance. As ACT does not incorporate an internal rehearsal of control techniques, 
individuals using ACT strategies would not be as affected by impairment associated with 
over-taxing verbal working memory. 
Few studies have examined the effect of ACT techniques on public speaking 
performance. Block (2003) reported that speech phobics displayed a significantly greater 
increase in speech length (i.e., decreased behavioral avoidance) after ACT treatment, 
relative to a control group. England (2010) also found significant objectively-rated 
improvement in performance during a public speaking task after group-based ACT 
treatments. Although these studies are the only ones to our knowledge that have 
examined acceptance-based techniques on speech performance, they provide preliminary 
evidence for the efficacy of ACT.   
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Although not centered on speech performance, a recent pilot study compared 
cognitive therapy to ACT for the treatment of test anxiety. Test anxiety has similarities to 
public speaking anxiety in that both involve performance-based tasks that require 
significant cognitive resources for successful performance.  Both treatment interventions 
resulted in similar reductions in anxiety, but the results suggested that the participants in 
the ACT condition performed better on their final exams than the participants who were 
randomized into the CT group (Brown, Forman, Herbert, 2008). 
Continued research investigating the effect of ACT and CT on speech 
performance, as well as further study that compares the efficacy of CT against ACT is 
needed. In summary, CT strategies demand considerable cognitive resources to monitor 
and dispute thoughts and to control anxiety, and some researchers hypothesize that the 
cognitive resources spent on reducing and controlling anxiety limits the attention that can 
be spent on social performance. Conversely, ACT focuses on accepting anxious thoughts 
in the service of goal-directed behavior (for example, giving a good speech). This 
strategy may free up the cognitive resources typically used to control anxiety in CT, 
allowing this cognitive resource to be used to enhance speech performance. By directly 
contrasting ACT and CT performance outcomes, this study may be able to provide 
preliminary support for these hypotheses. 
1.4 Anxiety and the Brain  
Exploring the neurological correlates of public speaking anxiety can help clarify 
how anxiety and associated performance problems are manifested in the brain. It may 
also explain why some individuals experience significant anxiety in public speaking 
situations, and how this anxiety interferes with performance. Furthermore, a greater 
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understanding of how these relationships change following the implementation of 
cognitive behavioral interventions may help build more effective treatments for public 
speaking anxiety, uncover baseline moderators of differential treatment outcomes, and 
provide continued support for the uniqueness of ACT. We will first review the 
methodologies and models that established the foundation for our understanding of the 
neurophysiology of anxiety. We can then explore the changes in the brain that 
accompany the treatment of anxiety and related disorders. 
Neuroimaging techniques have greatly influenced the field of neuropsychology. 
Electroencephalography (EEG), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and 
positron emission tomography (PET) technologies are able to detect activation in specific 
regions of the brain (Villringer & Chance, 1997). Because these different imaging 
systems measure different brain signals, brain activation can refer to blood volume, 
oxygenated or deoxygenated hemoglobin levels, or electrical activity, depending on the 
type of procedure used. There is evidence that these measures of brain activation are 
correlated with cognitive activity, and studies using EEG, fMRI and PET have been 
instrumental in the creation of models that describe the neuropsychological correlates of 
emotion and cognition (Villringer & Chance, 1997).  
In the mid-1980s, Richard Davidson presented a model proposing that right 
prefrontal regions are active in the processing of negative emotions, like anxiety and 
depression, whereas the left prefrontal regions are specified for positive 
emotions (Davidson, 1984). Since Davidson first asserted this model, multiple studies 
have supported it. One study reported increased activity in the right prefrontal cortex in 
depressed patients at rest compared to normal controls. Furthermore, mood induction 
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studies in non-depressed patients elicited the same results (De Raedta, D'Haenenb, 
Everaertc, Cluydtsa & Bossuyt, 1997). These findings, combined with older studies 
(Davidson & Fox, 1989; Fox, Bell, & Jones, 1992), support a model that associates right-
side activation with increased negative emotion. Davidson’s model served as the 
foundation for investigation of the neurological correlates of anxiety. 
1.4.1. Anxiety. In recent years, researchers have begun to examine the relationship 
between anxiety and brain activation. Davidson (2002) identified the prefrontal cortex as 
the primary brain structure involved in affective and anxiety disorders. Rauch and 
colleagues (1997) used PET to investigate brain activation in individuals with OCD, Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and simple phobias. Their results concluded that, 
upon symptom provocation, individuals exhibited increased right-hemisphere cerebral 
blood flow regardless of psychiatric condition (Rauch, Savage, Alpert, Fischman, & 
Jenike, 1997). Additional studies have shown that individuals with GAD (Mathew, et al., 
2004), and panic disorder (Wiedemann, et al., 1999) exhibit the same activations, and 
results for PTSD have been replicated (Rauch, et al., 1996). Davidson (2002) 
hypothesized that anxiety disorders exhibit this pattern of brain activation due to an 
excessive attention to threat-related stimuli. 
More recently, Schutter, Honk, d’Alfonso, Postma, and van Haan (2001) used 
repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to decrease cortical activity in the 
right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (RDLPFC) in healthy controls. These participants 
reported reduced anxiety after this period of stimulation. Although subsequent EEG 
readings did not indicate decreased right-hemisphere activity, participants did exhibit an 
increase in contralateral theta activity, which may explain the reduced anxiety. There has 
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been no research to date investigating the neurophysiology of speech anxiety in particular 
or performance-related anxiety, more generally. 
1.4.2. Social Anxiety Disorder. Only a few studies have examined the 
neurophysiologic correlates of SAD, and these studies either investigated the effect of 
pharmacological treatments or measured the anticipation of, and response to, anxious 
stimuli. Using PET, Tillfors, Furmark, Marteinsdottir, and Fredrikson (2002) measured 
brain activation in adults with SAD that were anticipating a public speaking exposure. 
Results indicated that these individuals experienced an increase in cerebral blood flow in 
the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (RDLPFC) and the temporal and amygdalar 
regions in comparison to normal controls. These results have been partially replicated in 
an EEG study as well (Davidson, Marshall, Tomarken, & Henriques, 2000). Sachs, 
Anderer, Dantendorfer & Saletu (2004) also noted significant increases in beta 
frequencies of the frontal and right central regions in anxious individuals with SAD. 
Another study investigated brain activation in adults with SAD who were anticipating the 
same type of exposure exercise.  In contrast to the results above, their study showed 
decreased activity in the prefrontal regions of individuals with SAD, though laterality 
was not reported. The authors believed that these results reflect the absence of logical 
reasoning and clarity of thought experienced by individuals with SAD during an exposure 
(Lorberbaum, et al., 2004). However, these results are less compelling in light of the 
small sample size (n=14), male-only group and lack of lateral analysis. 
These conflicting results support the need for additional research on the 
neurophysiologic correlates of SAD. Although hemispheric asymmetry (specifically 
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right-sided prefrontal activation) appears to be prominent in anxiety disorders, there is 
not yet enough evidence to draw reliable conclusions.  
To our knowledge, there have not been any studies to date that have investigated 
the biological correlates of public speaking anxiety. Examining how public speaking 
anxiety is manifested in the brain is critical to advancing our understanding of this 
pathology. It may help explain why many individuals experience significant anxiety in 
public speaking situations, and why this anxiety interferes with performance. 
Furthermore, it may help guide the creation of more effective interventions, and assist in 
matching particular patients to optimal treatments.  
1.5 Cognitive Interventions and Brain Activation 
There has been little research investigating the effect of therapeutic interventions 
on brain activity, and the results that have been reported are mixed. Allen and colleagues 
(1993) noted that bright light exposure for seasonal affective disorder did not change 
baseline anterior asymmetry noted in patients with a clinical diagnosis of the disorder. 
Similarly, the same group found no changes in hemispheric brain activation following 
acupuncture treatment for major depressive disorder (Allen, Urry, Hitt, & Coan, 2004). 
Deldin and Chu (2005) found that depressed individuals who exhibited greater overall 
cortical activity, especially in the right frontal region, at baseline were more likely to 
respond to a CT treatment than those without greater activation in these areas. 
Some studies have investigated changes in brain activation following cognitive-
behavioral treatments for anxiety disorders. Data from a small number of studies show 
changes in regional brain oxygenation following CT in panic disorder (Prasko, et al., 
2004), specific phobia (Paquette, et al., 2003), and OCD (Schwartz, Stoessel, Baxter, 
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Martin, & Phelps, 1996). These studies investigated brain activity using 2-fluoro-deoxy-
glucose positron emission tomography (FDG PET) before and after cognitive behavioral 
treatment in individuals with panic disorder. Changes in the brain’s metabolism of FDG 
(increased uptake) were noted in certain regions of the brain, with a significant left/right 
hemisphere difference. Paquette et al. (2003) used fMRI to investigate neural changes 
before and after CT treatment for spider phobia. After treatment, participants did not 
experience over-stimulation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex or the parahippocampal 
gyrus, during spider exposures. Both these regions were significantly activated during 
exposures given prior to treatment. 
1.5.1. Mindfulness and acceptance. There is some evidence of changes in brain 
activation following meditation and mindfulness training. Davidson et al. (2003) used 
EEG to measure brain electrical activity before and after an 8-week mindfulness 
meditation program. Individuals in the mediation group exhibited increased activation in 
the left side of the anterior scalp region when compared to waitlist controls. Left-side 
activation is associated with positive affect. Another study investigating brain chemistry 
and long-term meditation found that individuals who meditate regularly had increased 
cortical thickness in brain regions responsible for somatosensory, auditory, visual, and 
interceptive processing (Lazar, et al., 2005).  
Blacker, Herbert, Forman, and Kounios (2010), used EEG to compare an 
acceptance-based strategy to a control/distraction-based strategy for coping with 
experimentally-induced pain from a cold-pressor machine. According to her results, each 
intervention resulted in different patterns and intensities of neural activity. Participants 
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who used an acceptance strategy exhibited greater left-posterior activity compared to the 
control/distraction strategy (Blacker, 2010).   
Although mindfulness and acceptance are not identical concepts, they are 
theoretically similar and are core strategies used in some therapeutic treatments for 
psychological disorders. These results support the hypothesis that the strategies employed 
by psychological treatments are associated with changes in brain activation.  
These preliminary studies support the continued investigation of distinctive neural 
correlates of cognitive-behavioral therapies. Identifying changes in neural mechanisms 
between CT and ACT treatments would have significant implications for understanding 
anxiety and its impact on performance, as well as the mechanisms by which the two 
interventions exert their effects on these two constructs. In addition, neurophysiological 
data would aid in establishing the distinctiveness of the two treatments and perhaps even 
in the creation of new treatments.    
1.6 Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy 
Although most research uses PET and fMRI to examine changes in brain 
activation, these devices are not ideal for investigating public speaking anxiety. Not only 
are they expensive to operate, but they are large machines that limit mobility and restrict 
the ability to simulate real activities and experiences (e.g. giving a public speech to an 
audience). Alternatively, functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) is a small 
headband-like device that can be used without restricting engagement in activities. 
Although fNIRS cannot see as deep into the brain as PET and fMRI technology and does 
not have as high of a resolution, research indicates that it can image many of the brain 
regions important in assessing anxiety, performance, and changes associated with 
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treatment (Izzetoglu, Bunce, Izzetoglu, Onaral, & Pourrezaei, 2007). Studies using fNIRS 
in individuals with Alzheimer’s Disease, PTSD, and schizophrenia support the utility and 
validity of fNIRS for the investigation of brain activation in clinical populations during 
in-vivo exposures (Fallgatter, et al., 2007, Irani, Piatek & Buncce, 2007, Kubota , et al., 
2005). 
fNIRS analyzes brain activity by measuring the relative ratios of deoxygenated 
hemoglobin (deoxy-Hb) and oxygenated hemoglobin (oxy-Hb) in discrete areas of the 
brain (Hoshi, 2007; Izzetoglu, et al., 2007; Jobsis, 1977). Total blood volume (BV; also 
called total hemoglobin) is calculated by combining oxygenated and deoxygenated 
hemoglobin concentrations (oxy-Hb + deoxy-Hb), and oxygenation (oxy) is the 
difference between oxygenated and deoxygenated hemoglobin (oxy-Hb – deoxy-Hb). 
Increases in blood volume and oxygenated hemoglobin are often regarded as indicators of 
brain activation (Buxton, Wong & Frank, 1998; Fox & Raichle, 1986; Fox & Raichele, 
Mintun & Dence, 1988). Some research on cognitive and motor activation has also found 
patterns of increased oxygenation followed by decreased deoxygenation when a region of 
the brain is activated (Villringer & Chance, 1997). However, the research on 
deoxygenated hemoglobin change is much less consistent (Wobst, Wenzel, Kohl, Obrig, 
& Villringer, 2001). Currently, blood volume and oxygenation levels are utilized as the 
main indicators of brain activation, but it is unclear whether levels of deoxygenated 
hemoglobin or a difference in oxygenated and deoxygenated hemoglobin concentrations 
(oxy) are reliable measurements of activation (Culver, Siegel, Franceschini, Mandeville 
& Boas, 2005; Hoshi, Chen, & Tamura, 2001; Steinbrink et al., 2006). Researchers are 
encouraged to examine all four fNIRS markers (oxygenated hemoglobin, deoxygenated 
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hemoglobin, oxygenation, and blood volume) when utilizing the technology to examine 
brain activation across hemodynamic factors. 
fNIRS technology uses specific wavelengths of light, introduced at the scalp 
through a headband-like system, to enable the noninvasive measurement of oxygenation 
changes in the capillary beds during brain activity. The near-infrared light irradiated by 
the fNIRS system is absorbed at a different rate depending on the concentration of the 
chromophores (absorbers) within the underlying brain tissue. As a result, the light is 
reflected differently by deoxygenated and oxygenated blood and gives us information 
about the relative changes in brain activity of the regions measured (Edwards, et al., 
1993). This real-time feedback is unique to the fNIRS system and allows for the 
execution of a wide-range of tasks and functions while wearing the fNIRS headband. As 
this technology is portable, non-invasive, less time consuming, less prone to movement 
artifacts, and more cost-efficient than PET, fMRI, and other neuroimaging techniques 
(Izzetoglu, et al., 2007), it is suitable for the study of hemodynamic changes in brain 
activity under many working and emotional conditions.  
Despite the unique functionality of fNIRS and the need for additional 
neuropsychological research in clinical populations, this device has rarely been used in 
psychological research. A few studies have been executed that investigate brain activity 
in clinical populations by using fNIRS technology. Alzheimer’s Disease, depression, 
schizophrenia, panic disorder and PTSD have each received some attention, and one 
study has been done on individuals with SAD. 
Hock et al. (1996) was one of the first studies to use fNIRS for 
neuropsychological research. This study detected reduction in frontal lobe metabolism in 
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individuals with Alzheimer’s Disease compared to age-matched controls. Researchers 
have also used fNIRS to replicate fMRI and PET studies that found prefrontal 
hypoactivity and asymmetry in depression and bipolar disorder (Davidson & Irwin, 1999; 
Matsuo, Kato, & Kato, 2002). These studies provide excellent support for the efficacy of 
fNIRS in examining brain activation in clinical populations 
More recent studies have used fNIRS to explore frontal lobe hemispheric 
activation in psychiatric populations. Fallgatter and Strik (2000) found higher left/right 
deoxygenated hemoglobin levels in schizophrenics at baseline when compared to controls. 
Other studies have used fNIRS to replicate these results in the same population (Kubota, 
et al., 2005; Shinba, et al., 2004).   
fNIRS technology has also been used to investigate brain activation in anxiety 
disorders, including panic disorder and PTSD. León-Carrión et al. (2007) found that 
exposure to emotion-eliciting stimuli was linked to over-activation of the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, which persists after stimulus cessation. They also noted that non-
arousing stimuli did not produce the same effects in the brain. Akiyoshi and colleagues 
(2003) found that individuals with panic disorder exhibited decreased activity in the left 
frontal lobe when presented with anxiety-relevant or emotionally stimulating stimuli 
compared to controls. Another study associated the development of PTSD following the 
Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack with decreased levels of deoxygenated blood in the 
prefrontal cortex (Matsuo, et al., 2003). These studies support the use of fNIRS across the 
anxiety disorders spectrum. 
Tuscan, Herbert, Schultheis, Forman & Izzetoglu, (2007) explored frontal 
hemispheric activity in individuals with SAD using fNIRS. Brain activation 
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measurements were taken during the resting, anticipatory, and actives state of a 5-minute 
public speech exposure. Although Tuscan did not find a relationship between level of 
subjectively-reported anxiety and brain activation, she did find different levels of right 
hemisphere activation between the resting, anticipatory and active anxiety states across 
groups (Tuscan et al., 2007).  
Each of the studies reviewed in this section supports the functionality of fNIRS, 
and the use of this technology in anxious populations. These studies also validate the 
utility of fNIRS in the investigation of brain activation in clinical populations under in-
vivo conditions. This is especially relevant in the investigation of public speaking anxiety 
as it allows researchers to expose individuals to the situations that evoke anxiety while 
obtaining activation data from the prefrontal cortex in real time. Most importantly, these 
studies support the accuracy of this technology by replicating studies that use alternative 
neuroimaging techniques to investigate the frontal regions of the brain.  
1.7 Current Study 
As described above, a large proportion of the population (estimates range from 
34% to 85%) experience intense and debilitating anxiety with concomitant impairment of 
public speaking performance (Motley, 1995; Stein, et al., 1996). These symptoms can be 
intense enough to elicit significant distress and can significantly disrupt social, academic, 
and occupational functioning. Of special relevance, many sufferers experience 
impairments in speaking performance.   
A number of interventions have been designed to improve public speaking 
anxiety. These interventions generally employ CT techniques and focus on reducing 
anxiety through (a) changing (i.e., “restructuring”) cognitive factors (e.g., negative 
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thoughts and beliefs about one’s ability to perform) that are believed to generate social 
performance anxiety, and (b) exposure to the feared situation in order to facilitate 
habituation (Heimberg & Becker, 2002). Although moderately successful in reducing 
subjectively-reported fear, extant interventions have largely ignored public speaking 
performance and, not surprisingly, relatively little data is available to support efficacy in 
this domain.  
ACT is a newer behavioral therapy that does not seek to lower anxiety or alter 
anxiety-provoking cognitions.  Instead it teaches patients skills to be more “willing” to 
experience aversive thoughts and feelings in the service of valued behavior.  Very few 
empirical evaluations of ACT for social performance enhancement have been conducted. 
However, theoretically ACT may hold an advantage over CT. While CT demands 
resources to monitor and dispute thoughts and to monitor and control anxiety, ACT 
focuses on accepting anxious affect and cognition in the service of goal-directed behavior 
(for example, giving a good speech). Thus, ACT patients, compared to CT patients, may 
have greater resources to be focused on speech performance 
The proposed study compares the relative efficacy of ACT and CT in improving 
public speaking anxiety and performance while also investigating the neurophysiological 
changes associated with each intervention. Participants were randomized to a 90-minute, 
one-session ACT or CT intervention and were assessed at pre- and post-treatment. These 
assessments included a behavioral assessment test, fNIRS reading, and the completion of 
anxiety scales and treatment mechanism surveys. An analog population was chosen based 
on the novelty of this study and the success of prior studies that have recruited analog 
samples for single-session treatment protocols. 
	  30	  
The study aims to address eventual goals of improving the current interventions 
available for public speaking anxiety and to enhance our overall understanding of the 
relationship between anxiety, performance, and their neurophysiological correlates.  
 1.7.1 Formal Hypotheses 
Preliminary Hypotheses 
1. We expected that all individuals would experience a reduction in anxiety and an 
improvement in performance following the ACT and CT interventions, regardless of 
condition. 
2a. We hypothesized that lateralized dorsolateral prefrontal activation would increase 
as anxiety levels increased during the public speaking exposure, with greater 
activation in the right hemisphere. 
2b. We also hypothesized that activity in the DLPFC and subjective anxiety levels 
would follow a specific pattern during the pre-treatment BAT: an increase between the 
baseline date-task and the speech, and then a decrease between the speech and the 
post-speech date-task. We expect that activation levels will be higher in the right 
hemisphere. 
Primary Hypothesis – 
3a. We anticipated that performance would improve more in the ACT condition 
relative to the CT condition. 
3b.  We expected that there will be a differential effect of treatment on brain activation, 
with greater reductions in activation in the ACT condition for both hemispheres. 
Secondary Hypotheses – 
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4. We hypothesized that pre- to post-treatment reductions in brain oxygenation in the 
RDLPFC would correspond to pre- to post-treatment reductions in subjective anxiety. 
5. We hypothesized that improvements in performance would be inversely associated 
with decreased activity in the right and left DLPFC. 
Exploratory Hypotheses 
6. If ACT demonstrated a superior performance effect, we hypothesized that this effect 
would be mediated by decreased activation in the RDLPFC. 
7. If ACT demonstrated a superior performance effect, we hypothesize that this effect 
would be mediated by acceptance and defusion. 
 
CHAPTER 2: METHODS 
2.1 Participants 
Our final sample consisted of nineteen individuals from the greater Philadelphia 
community. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 49 years old (M = 27.91, SD = 9.28). 
The majority of participants were female (79%) and Caucasian (63%). Each participant 
qualified for a diagnosis of SAD using both (a) DSM-IV-TR criteria (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000) and (b) the social anxiety disorder subsection of the 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID). Participants also 
qualified for a public speaking subtype of SAD per the ADIS-IV (ADIS-IV; Brown, 
DiNardo, & Barlow, 1994), which allowed the clinician rater to assess for individual 
fears within the SAD spectrum.  
Nineteen participants completed the pre-treatment BAT (see figure 1 for 
CONSORT flow chart). Two of these individuals declined to participate in the 
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intervention and post-treatment assessment and seventeen completed the entire protocol. 
Of these seventeen participants, nine individuals completed pre- and post-treatment 
assessments in the CT condition, and eight individuals completed both assessments in the 
ACT condition. Three treatment completers (one in the CT condition, two in the ACT 
condition) were removed from fNIRS analyses due to equipment malfunction and one CT 
completer was removed from performance analyses due to video-recording malfunction 
during their pre-treatment BAT. 
2.1.1. Recruitment. Study staff recruited participants by advertising in multiple 
media outlets, and through flyers posted throughout the community. Study 
announcements were posted on the Drexel University Acceptance-Based Behavior 
Therapy Program’s website and the Drexel University Digest (a weekly email university-
wide newsletter). Other community resources (e.g., Craigslist) were also utilized.  
2.1.2. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria. In order to be eligible for participation, 
individuals had to be between the ages of 18 and 50 and currently living in the greater 
Philadelphia area. Fifty was selected as the cut-off to minimize age-related changes in 
brain activity in the sample. Public speaking was judged to be primary and of greater 
severity than any other comorbid Axis I disorders (such as depression or another anxiety 
disorder). 
All participants in our clinical sample met full diagnostic criteria for SAD, 
including significant distress and impairment in functioning. This criterion was chosen to 
maximize performance impairment in the sample. Eligible participants identified English 
as their first and dominant language, as there is evidence of brain activation differences 
during language-related tasks for bilingual individuals (Abutalebi, Cappa, & Perani, 
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2001). Those who were left-handed or ambidextrous by self-report were excluded from 
participation to avoid hemispheric confounds. Potential participants who reported any of 
the following were excluded from the study: 
• Age outside of inclusion range (two individuals excluded based on this criterion) 
• Generalized SAD (eleven individual excluded based on this criterion) 
• Non-primary SAD (one individuals excluded based on this criterion) 
• Meet criteria for SAD, public speaking subtype (five individuals excluded based 
on this criterion) 
• Bilingual (sixteen individuals excluded based on this criterion) 
• Left-handedness or ambidexterity (six individuals excluded based on this 
criterion) 
• History of neurological abnormalities (e.g. stroke, seizures, heart disease, 
migraines; four individuals excluded based on this criterion) 
• History of or current severe psychiatric illness (e.g. bipolar disorder, 
schizophrenia; no participants were excluded based on this criterion) 
• Unstable or serious medical illness (no participants were excluded based on this 
criterion) 
• History of alcohol or drug dependence, current diagnosis of any substance 
dependence (one individuals excluded based on this criterion) 
• Currently experiencing depressed mood or acute suicide potential (no participants 
were excluded based on this criterion) 
• Currently taking certain medications (e.g. psychotropic medication, blood-
pressure medications, “pain killers”, investigational medications, any medication 
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use associated with central nervous system effects e.g. neuroleptic medications, 
narcotic medications, opiates; five individuals excluded based on this criterion) 
• Use of marijuana or any another illegal drug (e.g. cocaine, heroin, ecstasy) during 
the week before the first study visit (no participants were excluded based on this 
criterion) 
• Mental retardation or any other pervasive developmental disorder (no participants 
were excluded based on this criterion) 
• Positive human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) diagnosis, because AIDS-related 
dementia compromises brain function, patients with positive HIV status/AIDS 
were excluded from this study (no participants were excluded based on this 
criterion) 
• Severe iron deficiency anemia, marked low hematocrit or hemoglobin (no 
participants were excluded based on this criterion) 
• Unwilling to participate (six individuals excluded based on this criterion) 
 
2.2 Procedure 
Upon calling or emailing the Social Anxiety Treatment Program in response to 
study fliers, a staff member fully explained the nature of ACT and CT treatments and the 
procedures for the study to the caller. Potential participants were also informed that they 
could cease participation at any time. If the caller expressed an interest in participating 
after this discussion, he/she was invited to our study office for screening and potential 
participation.  
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After arriving for the study session, all participants were fully consented and 
study staff obtained contact information. Following consent procedures, a member of the 
study staff conducted a brief structured interview to confirm eligibility for inclusion into 
the study. The ADIS-IV, SCID (social phobia section) and the DSM-IV-TR (2000) were 
used to confirm a primary diagnosis of SAD and public speaking anxiety. The Clinical 
Global Impressions Scale (CGI) was also administered to assess severity and ask about 
current psychotropic medication use and history of neurological and psychiatric illness, 
including drug and alcohol use. Each participant took the Edinburg Handedness 
Inventory to confirm right-handedness. 
This study utilized a between-subjects design. Participants were randomly 
assigned to either an ACT or CT intervention, and participated in two study assessments 
over the course of study participation (see figure 2 for study flow) 
Participants were paid $10 for completing the initial assessment and screening 
and an additional $40 if they were eligible for the study and completed all study 
procedures. A total of $50 was given to participants who completed all study procedures. 
(Three participants were compensated an extra $20 because there were complications in 
their visit, e.g., delay due to equipment malfunctioning). The first assessment was 
administered prior to the intervention and the second assessment was administered 
directly following it. Each study assessment included a behavioral assessment test (BAT), 
a video-recorded impromptu speech, fNIRS readings, and the completion of a 
questionnaire packet. 
Participants wore an fNIRS headband during the speech task to measure changes 
in brain oxygenation while performing the exposure tasks. This technology has been used 
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in multiple Drexel University studies in various conditions. In order to minimize 
invasiveness while collecting data about the task-related hemodynamic response 
occurring in the prefrontal cortex, the fNIR sensor was placed on the subject’s forehead 
following standardized procedures.  
Graduate students in the clinical psychology doctoral program conducted all data 
collection and treatment interventions under the supervision of Ph.D.-level faculty 
psychologists, who are recognized experts in both CT and ACT treatments for anxiety 
disorders. All sessions in both conditions were audio-recorded and systematically 
monitored for treatment adherence by these supervisors. Questionnaires were completed 
via survey monkey on a computer in the treatment room. All data were entered into a 
password protected computerized database on a weekly basis. 
A control group was not included because we are investigating how two active 
interventions compare against each other. There is ample evidence that both are superior 
to control conditions (e.g., no treatment wait lists, treatment as usual) for public speaking 
anxiety.  We compared baseline levels of anxiety to BAT and anxiety measurements from 
prior studies to ensure that we recruited a representative population that is not 
significantly affected by the presence of the fNIRS system. 
Practice effects were partially controlled by using a different speech topic for each 
exposure battery (although exposures I and II were assigned the same topic across 
groups). Participants were not given an indication of the speech topic prior to the start of 
the exposure. More importantly, we are looking at the effects of the intervention beyond 
practice effects, and we expected both groups to be equally affected by any practice 
effects. 
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Each participant was allowed as much time as necessary to ask questions 
following participation in the study. After debriefing, participants were asked to complete 
a feedback questionnaire.  
2.2.1 Interventions. Doctoral graduate students delivered the ACT and CT 
treatment sessions. Participants were randomly assigned to intervention condition, and a 
therapist was assigned to each participant based on availability and time of consent. All 
therapists treated a similar number of participants in each condition to preclude 
confounding therapist effects as much as possible. 
Both treatments included a rationale for the intervention and how to apply it to the 
upcoming speech exposure. In addition, participants practiced exercises to rehearse their 
new coping techniques prior to the second public speaking task. Each intervention spent 
an equal amount of time practicing exposure exercises to minimize variation between 
groups. 
Beckian Cognitive Behavioral Intervention (CT):  The individual CT intervention 
was 90-minutes long, and focused on symptom management and relaxation to help 
participants enhance their adaptive coping skills. This intervention taught individuals 
how to confront underlying issues related to their anxiety, and to test the validity of 
dysfunctional and irrational cognitions. These techniques were rehearsed during practice 
exposures as part of the intervention. See Appendix A for the CT treatment manual 
developed and used for this study. 
 Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT): The treatment delivered in this 
condition utilized concepts derived from Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (Hayes, 
Strosahl, et al., 1999). Treatment began by addressing the ineffectiveness of participants’ 
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past attempts to control or reduce their anxiety in public speaking situations. As an 
alternative to these control attempts, we introduced the notion of acceptance of one’s 
private experiences (thoughts, feelings, sensations). Treatment also focused on a 
“willingness” to experience unwanted thoughts and feelings while simultaneously 
engaging in valued activities, especially those related to public speaking. Another key 
concept, cognitive defusion, taught participants to view themselves as separate from their 
internal experiences, thereby allowing the private experiences to occur without 
preventing the participant’s engagement in exposure exercises. One example of a 
defusion exercise we used is “Picking Up The Pen.” In this exercise, each participant held 
a pen in the palm of his or her hand, and repeated the words “I can’t pick up the pen” 
several times while lifting the pen with the opposite hand, thus demonstrating that 
thoughts are not always true. Techniques designed to foster acceptance and defusion were 
rehearsed during practice exposures as part of the intervention. See Appendix A for the 
ACT treatment manual developed and used for this study. 
2.3 Measures  
Table 1 contains a list of study measures and their average time for completion. 
2.3.1 Clinician-Rated Measures. 
2.3.1.1. Diagnostic Interviews. 
Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV): A member of the 
study staff completed an ADIS-IV (Brown, DiNardo, & Barlow, 1994) with each 
individual following the consenting process. The ADIS-IV is a diagnostic interview that 
assesses a variety of anxiety disorders using DSM-IV-TR criteria. Only the social phobia 
and depression portions of the ADIS-IV were used in this study in addition to a DSM-IV-
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TR diagnosis. Inter-rater reliability for diagnosing SAD using the ADIS-IV is high 
(Brown, DiNardo, Lehman, & Campbell, 2001). The ADIS-IV is often used to improve 
diagnostic accuracy in research studies (e.g. Dalrymple & Herbert, 2007) Newman, 
Kachin, Zuellig, Constantino, & Cashman-McGrath, 2003). The ADIS-IV also helps to 
distinguish between generalized SAD and public-speaking phobia and identify any 
significant mood symptoms. According to standard ADIS-IV procedure, potential 
participants in the current study were given the initial screening portion of the interview, 
and only the relevant diagnostic modules as indicated by the screening measure were 
administered thereafter. 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID) – Social 
Anxiety Disorder Subsection: The SCID (First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1996) is an 
extensively utilized structured diagnostic interview based on DSM-IV (APA, 1994) 
criteria. Estimates of inter-rater reliability are moderate to high for SAD (e.g., Williams 
et al., 1992; Zanarini & Frankenburg, 2001). The SCID has also demonstrated superior 
diagnostic validity over other structured clinical interviews at intake (Basco et al., 2000; 
Fennig, Craig, Lavelle, Kovasznay, & Bromet, 1994; Fennig, Naisberg-Fennig, Craig, 
Tanenberg-Karant, & Bromet, 1996; Kranzler et al., 1995; Kranzler, Kadden, Babor, 
Tennen, & Rounsaville, 1996). Dalrymple and Herbert (2007) successfully utilized the 
SCID to identify individuals with generalized SAD. All participants qualified for a 
diagnosis of social phobia on the SAD section of the SCID before participating in the 
study. 
Clinical Global Impression – Severity Scale (CGI-S): The CGI (National Institute 
of Mental Health, 1985) is a clinician-rated measure of global symptom severity and 
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improvement. The CGI-Severity (CGI-S) was used for this study, and requires the 
clinician to rate symptom severity on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (normal/not at all 
ill) to 7 (among the most extremely ill patients). The CGI-S demonstrates good 
convergent validity with self-report measures of quality of life and with self-report and 
clinician-administered measures of social anxiety (Zaider, Heimberg, Fresco, Schneier, & 
Liebowitz, 2003).  
2.3.1.2 Outcome Assessments 
Behavioral Assessment Test (BAT): The BAT was administered during each 
assessment. The BAT consists of three parts: a date-naming control task, an impromptu 
speech before a small virtual audience (i.e., graduate-student confederates previously 
videotaped), and then another date-naming control task following the speech. The two 
control tasks (pre- and post-impromptu speech) were identical and lasted for 10 seconds 
each. For these two control tasks, the experimenter asked the participant to list a series of 
random dates of the year out loud. They were told that the dates they picked were not 
important, but that they just needed to speak as much as possible so that the fNIRS could 
calibrate to the fine movements that were elicited by speaking. This rationale was given 
to reduce the amount of anxiety and social pressure that the individual experienced 
during the control task. Participants were instructed to speak for the entire duration of the 
speech task (they were not told that the task lasted for four minutes). Prior to beginning 
the BAT, participants were prompted to choose a speech topic randomly by drawing a 
topic from a box. In actuality, each piece of paper in the box listed the same topic 
depending on the participant and study time-point: “Things to do in the Philadelphia area” 
(at pre-treatment) and “Description of an ideal vacation” (at post-treatment). These topics 
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were counterbalanced across assessment time-points to avoid order effects. The 
experimenter provided the participant with an index card, which the participant could 
hold up to indicate when he or she wishes to stop the speech. Visual cues were chosen 
because socially anxious participants may be too anxious to verbalize their request to 
terminate the exposure (McNeil, Ries, & Turk, 1995). The following instructions 
regarding exiting the BAT were given prior to initiating the speech: “We would like you 
to continue speaking for four minutes. When you reach four minutes, I will tell you to 
stop.” If a participant remained silent for a period of twenty seconds, or requested to stop 
the BAT prior to the end of four minutes, they were given a series of neutral 
encouragements to continue such as “please try and continue” or “just say whatever 
comes to mind” for the first three attempts to stop the task. If the participant request to 
stop for a fourth time, there was no further encouragement. However, they remained 
standing and focused on the video-camera for the remainder of the 4 minutes. The start of 
video recording was synced with the start of fNIRS measurements to facilitate analysis. 
The entire speech was videotaped and rated by study assessors who were masked 
to study time-point and intervention condition. These assessors provided ratings of 
perceived anxiety and speech performance, using 0-100 scale, on the full 4 minutes of 
each BAT speech (or less, for cases in which the participant fails to speak for four 
minutes). The four-minute time frame was chosen to reduce variability in the length of 
speech time (and to facilitate controlling for certain speech characteristics, such as 
number of words). A second assessor rated 30% of the BAT speeches for reliability 
purposes.  
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A standardized speech length allows us to control for the number of utterances 
produced, complexity of utterances (grammar, word use), number of words, or any other 
element of verbal fluency that we decide must be controlled across groups. 
The assessors provided ratings of perceived anxiety and performance, using a 0-
100 scale. More specifically, assessors rated social skills on three dimensions: verbal 
content, nonverbal skills, and paralinguistic skills. Staff also provided a rating of overall 
speech performance, using the same 100-point scale. The length of speech was recorded 
as a measure of behavioral avoidance. There is support for the use of social skills ratings 
in role-play tests, including speech tasks (Herbert et al., 2005). Intraclass correlation 
coefficients between the two observers was .79 (95% CI: .76-.95, p < .01).   
Speech Performance Scale (SPS). The video-recorded BAT was also evaluated 
for performance by independent observers using the SPS (Rapee & Lim, 1992). Raters, 
masked to condition and time-point, rated each participant’s performance using this 17-
item measure. The SPS evaluates both specific (e.g., kept eye contact with audience, had 
a clear voice) and global (e.g., kept audience interested, generally spoke well) elements. 
Each item is rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much), and 
higher scores signify better performance. Some items are reversed to avoid response 
biases. This scale has good internal consistency (Rapee & Lim, 1992). A primary rater (a 
different assessor from the individual who scored anxiety and performance) evaluated all 
of the recordings. A second assessor rated 30% of the SPS speeches for reliability 
purposes. Raters were trained to a reliability level of .80.  
Subjective Units of Discomfort Scale (SUDS): Participants were taught how to 
rate their anxiety on the Subjective Units of Discomfort Scale (SUDS; Wolpe & Lazarus, 
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1966), which ranges from 0-100, upon completing screening procedures. SUDS ratings 
were obtained throughout participation in the study and are the primary anxiety outcome 
measure. For the purpose of syncing fNIRS measurements, performance and anxiety, 
SUDS ratings were obtained prior to beginning the exposure, at the conclusion of the 
exposure, and during the exposure after 30 seconds, 1.5 minutes, 2.5 minutes and 3.5 
minutes have elapsed. These time-notations were also marked on the fNIRS readings to 
enable comparison between SUDS rating and fNIRS readings. Participants provided 
ratings of perceived anxiety and speech performance, using the same scale (0-100) that 
the objective raters used for their BAT ratings.  
In order to connect high levels of anxiety to brain activation, we matched high 
SUDS ratings for each individual with their brain activation at the time of the rating.  
Controlled Oral Word Association Test: Participants were given the Controlled 
Oral Word Association Test as a measure of verbal fluency abilities at baseline to rule out 
potential differences between groups. This test is shown to be intact in anxiety disorders 
(Beaudreau & O'Hara, 2009) and has outstanding test-retest reliability (Ruff, Light, 
Parker, & Levin, 1996). This test was given during the pre-intervention assessment. 
2.3.2 Self Report Measures. 
2.3.2.1. Demographic Form  
Demographics and Medical History Form:  This form is a self-report measure 
created by the investigators that includes questions regarding sex, age, handedness, 
ethnicity, occupation, marital status, first language, education level, treatment history, 
significant medical, neurological and psychological events or disorders, and current mood 
and anxiety levels. 
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2.3.2.2. Edinburgh Handedness Inventory 
 Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (EHI): This form consists of 10-items geared to 
determine an individual’s dominant hand for everyday activities. Scores range from -100 
for strong left-handedness to +100 for strong right-handedness. This survey has shown 
good test-retest reliability and is a common measure of handedness across research 
studies (Ransil & Schachter, 1994). The EHI was given at screening to ensure right-
handed dominance. 
2.3.2.2. Philadelphia Area Familiarity Scale 
Philadelphia Area Familiarity Scale: This questionnaire was created for the 
purpose of this study. Participants were asked to rate their knowledge of the Philadelphia 
area on a 1-5 scale. This ensures that both groups have an equal amount of baseline 
knowledge of Philadelphia area activities, which is the topic of their first exposure speech. 
The second exposure speech on an ideal vacation does not need a baseline control. This 
scale was given at the pre-intervention assessment. 
2.3.2.4. Outcome Measures 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – State Scale: The STAI (STAI; Spielberger, 1983; 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) is a 40-question self-report scale. It is divided 
into two sections – one measuring state-anxiety and one measuring trait-anxiety. We only 
used the state-scale.  Individuals are asked to rate how they feel at the present moment on 
a 4-point Likert scale (“not at all” to “very much so,”). Example items include “I feel 
tense” and “I feel nervous.” Both STAI scales have high internal consistency (Spielberger, 
1989) and adequate convergent and discriminant validity (Spielberger, 1983). The state-
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anxiety scale has also shown sensitivity to anxiety changes over time (Spielberger, 1983), 
supporting its use as a measure of transitory and situational anxiety.  
Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker (PRCS)—Short Form: The PRCS 
(Hook, Smith, and Valentiner, 2008) is a 12-item self-report measure of confidence in 
public speaking situations. All questions are in true/false format. It has significant 
internal consistency and construct validity, as well as convergent validity with measures 
of anxiety, social performance anxiety, shyness, and self-consciousness. 
Self-Statements During Public Speaking (SSPS): The SSPS (Hofmann & 
DiBartolo, 2000) is a 10-item self-report measure designed to assess cognitions in public 
speaking situations. The SSPS contains two 5-item subscales: Positive Self-Statements 
(SSPS-P) and Negative Self-Statements (SSPS-N). Items are rated on a 6-point Likert 
scale ranging from 0 (do not agree at all) to 5 (agree extremely). Both subscales of the 
SSPS have good internal consistency (Hofmann & DiBartolo, 2000; Hofmann, 
Moscovitch, Kim, & Taylor, 2004), test-retest reliability, and convergent and 
discriminant validity (Hofmann & DiBartolo).  
Personal Report of Communication Apprehension (PRCA-24): The PRCA-24 
(McCroskey, 1982) is a shortened version of the original 25-item PRCA (McCroskey, 
1970). The PRCA-24 consists of 24 self-report items assessing communication 
apprehension in four contexts: group discussions, meetings, interpersonal conversations, 
and public speaking. Items consist of statements to be rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale 
ranging from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Disagree.” The PRCA-24 has high internal 
consistency, criterion validity, content validity (McCroskey, Beatty, Kearney, & Plax, 
1985), construct validity (Keaten, Kelly, Begnal, Heller, & Walker, 1993) and convergent 
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validity (Keaten & Kelly, 1994). Test-retest reliability is also high (Rubin, Graham, & 
Mignerey, 1990), supporting the use of the PRCA-24 as a trait measure of 
communication apprehension.  
2.3.2.5. Treatment Process Measures 
Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale: The PHLMS (Cardaciotto, Herbert, Forman, 
Moitra, & Farrow, 2008) is a 20-item self-report measure that assesses moment-to-
moment experiential awareness and non-judgmental acceptance – two elements of 
mindfulness. Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “never” to “very 
often” according to how often that item was experienced within the past week. Factor 
analyses support a two-factor structure including an awareness and acceptance subscale. 
These subscales are not correlated with one another. Good internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .85 and .87 for Awareness and Acceptance, respectively) has been 
demonstrated in both clinical and non-clinical samples. The PHLMS has adequate 
concurrent validity with other measures of mindfulness (Cardaciotto et al., 2008). 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II): The AAQ-II (Bond et al., 
2008) is a 10-item self-report measure of emotional avoidance and inaction. Items are 
scored on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “never true” to “always true.” The AAQ-2 
is a slightly revised version of the original AAQ, which had adequate convergent, 
discriminant, and concurrent validity (Hayes et al, 2001, 2004; Roemer & Orsillo, 2001). 
The AAQ-II has adequate concurrent, predictive, convergent, discriminative, and 
incremental validities and test-retest reliability (Bond et al. 2008). 
Drexel Defusion Scale (DDS): The DDS (Forman, Herbert, Moitra, & England, 
2008) is a 10-item self-report measure of cognitive defusion. Using a on a 6-point Likert 
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scale ranging from “not at all” to “very much”, participants answer questions about their 
ability to defuse from thoughts or feelings in 10 different domains. Internal reliability, 
inter-item correlations, and internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .80 for the clinical 
and .83 for the nonclinical sample) are high. Furthermore, the DDS has a high convergent 
validity with measures of psychological acceptance and quality of life. 
Reaction to Treatment Questionnaire (RTQ): The RTQ (Holt & Heimberg, 1990) 
is a 17-question self-report measure that evaluates treatment credibility and outcome 
expectancy. The RTQ has demonstrated high internal consistency and convergent validity 
(Safren, Heimberg, & Juster, 1997).  
2.3.3. Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy. Functional near-infrared 
spectroscopy (fNIRS) is a continuous, non–invasive and portable neuroimaging technique 
that monitors changes in blood oxygenation and blood volume. We used the fNIR system 
described by Izzetoglu et al. (2005). The fNIRS system is composed of 1) sensor that 
covers the entire forehead; 2) a control box for data acquisition; and 3) a computer for the 
data analysis and storage. The fNIRS sensor (18 cm × 6 cm × 0.8 cm) that sits on the 
forehead has four light sources with 10 photo-detectors. The data collection procedure is 
arranged in such a way that 16 voxels of data can be collected. Each light source consists 
of three light emitting diodes (LEDs) with wavelengths of 730, 805 and 850 nm (±15 nm). 
The light is consecutively illuminated by these LEDs and collected by the nearest four 
detectors after it has interacted with the underlying tissue. The temporal resolution of the 
system is approximately 500 ms for one complete data acquisition cycle (about 2 Hz). 
From the intensity measurements relative concentrations of oxygenated hemoglobin 
(oxy-Hb) and deoxygenated hemoglobin (deoxy-Hb) were calculated using a modified 
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Beer-Lambert law, which calculates the absorption of light for a particular substance’s 
concentration. Different features such as mean and maximum values or time to reach 
maximum were extracted from oxy-Hb and deoxy-Hb during the pre- and post- activation 
tasks to reduce the amount of data and to be used in further analysis. This system has 
been used in individuals with traumatic brain injury, borderline personality disorder, and 
healthy controls (Irani, Piatek & Buncce, 2007). 
Baseline fNIRS measurements for each individual were collected prior to the first 
assessment. Individuals were fitted with the fNIRS device prior to beginning the BAT. 
We obtained 10 seconds of resting fNIRS measurements. These readings were used as 
baseline measurements for comparison against active states during the exposure task. 
Study staff members who analyzed and interpreted the fNIRS data were masked to 
treatment condition. 
2.4 Ethical Issues 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to any data collection. 
Study staff ensured that all participants understand that they can refuse to continue 
participation at any time. Each participant was fully informed of the potential risks of all 
study procedures during the consenting process. There were no adverse reactions reported 
by any participants. Should a participant have had an adverse reaction that could not be 
readily be resolved during sessions, it would have been immediately reported to Drexel 
University’s Office of Research Compliance. 
All study data are kept in a secure, password-protected computer in a locked 
research office. Data are stored without identifying information, and separately from the 
informed consent forms. All study data have been double-coded for confidentiality. A 
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participant number is being used to identify participant data. Only the project coordinator 
and faculty advisors have access to the key that links ID number and identifying 
information. All data and informed consent forms are stored for at least three years 
following completion of the study, in accordance with Drexel University’s IRB 
guidelines. 
2.5 Data Analysis  
 Data were managed and analyzed using SPSS 19.0 for Mac.  
 2.5.1. Analysis of fNIRS data. The raw intensity measurements were low-pass 
filtered to eliminate respiration and heart rate and high frequency noise. As participants 
were standing during the exposure exercises, the fNIRS data may have become corrupted 
by motion artifacts and was processed using a combined ICA/PCA algorithm (see 
Izzetoglu et al., 2008 for further discussion). This algorithm has been shown to remove 
motion interference from the fNIRS data in a previous study conducted in the operating 
room. Relative concentration changes for oxygenated hemoglobin (oxy-Hb) and 
deoxygenated hemoglobin (deoxy-Hb) were obtained for approximately every .5 seconds 
from the artifact removed intensity measurements using a modified Beer-Lambert law.  
 Trends in the data were analyzed to examine patterns of oxy-Hb, deoxy-Hb, and 
total hemoglobin (BV) across time and groups. Data from individual voxels were 
examined separately and then averaged in different manners (according to columns, 
blocks of four voxels, etc.). Left and right hemispheres were defined as the region 
covered by the eight voxels to the left and right of the center of the probe, respectively. 
 In addition to full time course analysis, features such as mean value, maximum 
value, increases, and decreases in oxygenated and deoxygenated hemoglobin 
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measurements in different time blocks (e.g. 5 seconds, 10secs) were extracted and 
examined for each 5-minute block. Comparisons of these features were made for both 
baseline (resting) and pre- and post-treatment values, within blocks, across blocks, and 
between hemispheres.  
 2.5.2. Preliminary analyses. Baseline data from participants in the two treatment 
conditions were compared on demographic, outcome, and process variables using t-tests 
to confirm that there were no pre-existing differences between groups. Data were also 
inspected and tested to ensure that they met the assumptions of an analysis of variance 
(ANOVA; e.g., normal distribution, homogeneity of variance and covariance). Data were 
plotted for visual examination and inspected for outliers and normal distribution, and 
tested for skewness and kurtosis. Data were also tested using Levene’s test for 
homogeneity of variance.  
 2.5.3. Statistical analyses.  
 Preliminary Hypothesis 1: In order to evaluate the first three hypotheses, a series of 
2 (treatment condition) x 2 (assessment occasion) mixed factorial ANOVAs using 
assessment point (pre-treatment and post-treatment) as the within-participants variable 
and treatment condition (ACT versus CT) as the between-participants variable were 
executed. Dependent variables for the ANOVAs were (1) anxiety using the highest 
SUDS ratings during the exposure, and (2) objective speech performance ratings derived 
from the BAT. The main effect of time (i.e., assessment point) evaluated the hypothesis 
that individuals would experience a reduction in anxiety and an improvement in 
performance following the ACT and CT interventions, regardless of condition.  
 Preliminary Hypothesis 2a: We expected that RDLPFC activation would increase 
	  51	  
as anxiety levels increased during the public speaking exposure. Correlation analyses 
between objective and subjective anxiety level and fNIRS markers were run to determine 
if individuals with high anxiety (as indicated by baseline SUDS scores) exhibited 
lateralized levels of brain oxygenation (as measured by fNIRS) in the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex at baseline. 
 Preliminary Hypothesis 2b: We also hypothesized that activity in the DLPFC and 
subjective anxiety levels would follow a specific pattern during the pre-treatment BAT: 
an increase between the baseline date-task and the speech, and then a decrease between 
the speech and the post-speech date-task. We expect that activation levels will be higher 
in the right hemisphere. To examine this hypothesis, we ran a series of 3 x 2 (time x 
hemisphere) repeated measures ANOVAS examining the interaction of time (pre-speech, 
speech, post-speech) and hemisphere (left vs. right) on each fNIRS marker during the 
pre-treatment assessment. Additional follow-up tests (unadjusted t-tests) were used where 
necessary to determine where significant differences existed within our ANOVA results.  
 Hypothesis 3: We anticipated that performance would improve more in the ACT 
condition relative to the CT condition. The interaction terms of the 2x2 ANOVAs from 
hypothesis 1 were used to examine the interaction of time and treatment group on 
performance. 
 Hypothesis 3b: We also examined whether changes in brain activation differed 
between treatment conditions, expecting greater reductions in activation in the ACT 
condition for both hemispheres. We used the interaction terms from a series of repeated-
measures 2x2x2 ANOVAs to examine the interaction of treatment condition, assessment 
point, and hemisphere on each fNIRS marker. Additional follow-up tests (unadjusted t-
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tests) were used where necessary to determine where significant differences existed 
within our ANOVA results.  
Hypotheses 4 and 5: We hypothesized that pre- to post-treatment reductions in 
brain oxygenation in the RDLPFC would correspond to pre- to post-treatment reductions 
in subjective anxiety and objective performance. A correlation matrix was used to 
determine the relationship between lateralized brain activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, anxiety and performance. 
Hypothesis 6: In the event of a significant relationship between treatment condition 
and performance (hypothesis 2), we hypothesized that the relationship between treatment 
condition and improvements in performance was mediated by decreased activation in the 
RDLPFC (figure 3). 
Mediation can be tested through a variety of statistical methods. One method, 
bootstrapping, is a resampling method that deals with the common problem of the lack of 
normality of indirect effects (Preacher & Hayes, 2008; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). 
Resampling refers to a complex statistical procedure wherein a sample size of n cases is 
taken, with replacement, from the original sample and all paths are re-estimated and the 
indirect effect is re-calculated. This process is repeated k times with k being preferably at 
least 1,000. Thus, the statistical method yields k estimates of the total (c path) and 
indirect effects (ab paths) of the independent variable (treatment condition) on the 
dependent variable (performance). This creates new distributions, which serve as 
empirical, nonparametric approximations of the sampling distributions of the indirect 
effect (i.e., the effect of treatment condition on performance through brain oxygenation). 
Bootstrap confidence intervals are created by ordering the k values of the indirect 
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effect (i.e., ab paths) from low to high. Researchers have argued that bias corrected 
bootstrap confidence intervals should be used because they provide more accurate 
estimates of the confidence interval and thus better prevent errors in hypothesis testing 
(Efron & Tibshirani, 1993; Preacher & Hayes, 2008; Shrout & Bolger, 2002).  
Bootstrapping with bias corrected confidence intervals is superior to other tests of 
mediation such as causal steps approaches (e.g., Baron & Kenny, 1986) and product-of-
coefficients approaches (see MacKinnon et al., 2002 for a review) in terms of power and 
Type I error rates, especially in smaller samples with smaller effects (Preacher & Hayes, 
2008; Shrout & Bolger, 2002).  Noteworthy, is that this method does not require that the 
“a” path (e.g., the relationship between treatment condition and change in right prefrontal 
brain oxygenation) or the “b” path (e.g., the relationship between brain oxygenation and 
performance) to be significant. To measure if levels of brain oxygenation mediated the 
relationship between performance improvements and treatment condition, we used a 
bootstrapping method with bias corrected confidence intervals based on the macros 
created by Preacher and Hayes (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).  
Coefficients and p values were examined in regard to the total effect of treatment 
condition on performance (c path) and the direct effect of treatment condition on 
performance (c’ path). The indirect effect of treatment condition on performance through 
brain oxygenation (ab paths) was examined based on the difference between the total and 
direct effect (i.e., c – c’ = ab). The significance of the indirect effect was examined based 
on the critical ratio (i.e., the indirect effect divided by the standard error), which yields a 
Z value on the macro output. Additionally, significance was examined via the bias 
corrected confidence intervals provided for the indirect effect, which is also included on 
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the macro output. It should be noted that although mediation is a causal model, the 
current study's research design does not permit one to draw firm causal conclusions. 
Future, longitudinal-based studies that analyze these data with sophisticated statistical 
methods (e.g., hierarchical linear modeling) over long-term treatment interventions would 
be more suited to drawing conclusions regarding the temporal relationship between these 
constructs.  
Hypothesis 7: In the event of a relationship between treatment condition and 
performance (hypothesis 2), we hypothesized that the relationship between treatment 
condition and improvements in performance would be mediated by acceptance and 
defusion (figure 4). Mediational analyses examining psychological acceptance and 
defusion as mediators of the relationship between treatment condition and improvements 
in performance were performed in the same way as hypothesis 6.  
2.5.4. Power analysis. The aim of this pilot study is to achieve adequate power to test the 
hypothesis that the treatments decrease anxiety and increase performance, and to obtain 
preliminary effect-size data to evaluate hypotheses concerning the superiority of ACT 
and the mediational hypotheses concerning brain activity and ACT processes.  Thus, a 
power analysis was performed for the effect of intervention on outcome.  Prior studies 
investigating CT (e.g., Heimberg et al., 1998) and ACT (Dalrymple & Herbert, 2007) for 
the treatment of SAD have found large pre- to-post effect sizes in outcome measures.  
A power analysis program G*Power 3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007; 
Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) recommended 40 participants (20 per group) to 
achieve a power of .80 for a large effect size (f = 0.4) at α = .05 for a 2-group, 2-
repetition ANOVA. Because this is a single-session study, we do not anticipate 
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significant attrition rates, though the potential for participant dropout does exist. As a 
result, a final sample size of 44 was targeted. Because we only recruited a sample of 
nineteen individuals, all of our analyses were underpowered. Therefore, our results and 
conclusions focus more on an examination of effect sizes rather than relying solely on 
tests of statistical significance.    
 
CHAPTER 3: RESULTS 
 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 The two treatment conditions were compared on demographic, outcome, and 
process variables at baseline using t-tests. Differences between groups were small and 
statistically insignificant, with one exception: the CT group exhibited higher baseline 
SUDS (t = 2.22, p = .40, d = 1.02). Thus, all primary analyses controlled for baseline 
SUDS score, either by using residualized gain scores or for including baseline SUDS as a 
covariate. Primary variables were tested for skewness, kurtosis, and homogeneity of 
variance to verify all of the assumptions were met for the Analysis of Variance model. 
We did not find any violations to these assumptions.  
3.2 Data Reduction and Parameter Averages 
 
 Relative concentration changes for oxygenated hemoglobin (oxy-Hb) and 
deoxygenated hemoglobin (deoxy-Hb), blood volume (BV), and oxygenation (oxy) were 
recorded throughout the experimental session every .5 seconds. Data were collected 
continually across the entire testing period, and manual markers were used to indicate the 
beginning and ending of each resting period, baseline period, and the active speech phase. 
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This methodology allowed for the isolation of the brain activity associated with different 
tasks across all individuals. Observed variables from each active phase (pre-speech 
random dates, 4-minute speech, post-speech random dates) were calculated by computing 
the difference from the preceding baseline phase to its active phase for each voxel to 
account for individual differences in baseline brain activity. These data were reduced by 
averaging the values taken every .3 seconds to calculate a single value per voxel for each 
task. Voxels 11, 12, 13 and 14 were isolated due to their correspondence to the RDLPFC 
and voxels 3, 4, 5, and 6 for the left hemisphere. Multiple voxels are averaged to improve 
accuracy due to the size of the RDLPFC and individual differences in device placement 
and brain activation. A professor of biomedical engineering familiar with fNIRS data and 
design performed this data reduction and analysis.  
 Self-reported SUDS levels were obtained at 30-second intervals throughout the 
speech, for a total of eight SUDS levels over the four-minute BAT speech. For the 
purpose of our data analysis, speech SUDS levels were averaged together to create a 
single SUDS rating to represent a subjective speech anxiety level. 
3.3 Preliminary Analyses 
 
  Preliminary Hypothesis 1: To examine whether participants experienced a 
reduction in anxiety (measured by SUDS) and an improvement in performance 
(measured by objectively-rated SUDS and SPS) from pre- to post-treatment, we ran a 
series of 2 (treatment condition) x 2 (assessment occasion) mixed factorial ANOVAs. For 
this hypothesis, the main effect of time was examined.  The hypothesis was supported 
(see table 2), as individuals experienced a very large and statistically significant decrease 
in anxiety and a corresponding improvement in performance following the 90-minute 
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intervention. 
 Preliminary Hypothesis 2a: We expected that right DLPFC activation would 
increase as anxiety levels increased during the pre-treatment public speaking exposure. 
To examine the relationship between DLPFC activation and subjective anxiety level, 
residualized change scores (baseline date-naming task to 2-minute speech mark) were 
calculated for BV, oxy, oxy-Hb, deoxy-Hb, and SUDS. We chose a shortened period (the 
middle 90 seconds of the speech) rather than using the full 4-minute average in order to 
better momentary relationships between anxiety and brain activation. Residualized 
change scores could not be calculated for objective anxiety ratings because there was 
only one rating per BAT, so objective-anxiety was compared to fNIRS markers during 
the BAT speech alone. We computed a series of zero-order correlations a) between 
residualized change scores for hemispheric BV, oxy, oxy-Hb, deoxy-Hb, self-report 
SUDS and b) single measurements of objectively reported performance (SPS score) and 
fNIRS activation in the right and left hemispheres during the BAT speech. Our 
hypothesis was only supported for blood volume, which was significantly correlated with 
changes in subjective anxiety in the right hemisphere only (see table 3). Data for oxy-Hb 
and deoxy-Hb did not support this hypothesis, as correlations were small and 
insignificant in the right hemisphere. However, oxygenated hemoglobin was moderately 
associated with self-reported anxiety level in the left hemisphere only, and deoxy-Hb in 
the left hemisphere was moderately associated with objectively rated anxiety. 
 Preliminary Hypothesis 2b: We also hypothesized that activity in the DLPFC and 
subjective anxiety levels would follow a specific pattern during the pre-treatment BAT: 
an increase between the baseline date-naming task and the speech, and then a decrease 
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between the speech and the post-speech date-naming task. We were also interested in 
hemispheric differences in this pattern, hypothesizing that the right hemisphere would 
show greater increases in activation in comparison to the left hemisphere. To examine 
these hypotheses, we ran a series of 3 (pre-speech, speech, post-speech) x 2 (left vs. right 
hemisphere) repeated-measures ANOVAS examining the interaction of time and 
hemisphere on each fNIRS marker during the pre-treatment BAT. The results of these 
analyses are consistent with our hypothesized patterns of brain activation and anxiety 
levels for three of the fNIRS markers. The main effects of time on blood volume, 
oxygenation, and oxygenated hemoglobin were significant, while the effect on 
deoxygenated hemoglobin approached significance (see table 4). Tukey’s post-hoc 
analyses indicated that there were significant increases in blood volume level between the 
pre-speech task and the speech, and then a decrease in activity between the speech and 
the post-speech task for blood volume, oxygenation and oxygenated hemoglobin, as 
predicted. Deoxygenated hemoglobin decreased between the pre-speech and speech 
phases, and then increased between the speech and post-speech phases, replication 
previous research suggesting decreases in deoxygenated hemoglobin is associated with 
increases in activation. Effect sizes indicated a small hemispheric effect for blood volume 
(right DLPFC was greater than left DLPFC) and oxygenation (left DLPFC was greater 
than right DLPFC; see table 4), though only the main effect of hemisphere for 
deoxygenated hemoglobin approached significance. 
In accordance with our hypothesis that there would be greater brain activation in 
the right hemisphere during the pre-treatment BAT speech, there was a large effect of 
hemisphere by time for oxygenation (F (1,15) = 6.80, p < .01, ηp2 = .31), deoxygenated 
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hemoglobin (F (1,15) = 5.51, p =.02, ηp2 = .28) and blood volume (F (1,15) = 3.70, p 
=.06, ηp2 = .20), all either statistically significant or approaching significance. There was 
no meaningful effect for oxygenated hemoglobin (F (1,15) = .30, p =.66, ηp2 = .02).  
Because there was a notable time by hemisphere interaction effect for three fNIRS 
markers, Tukey’s HSD and simple main effects were examined for post-hoc analyses. An 
examination of simple main effects indicated that there was a main effect of time within 
each hemisphere for blood volume (see figure 5, table 5), oxygenation (see figure 6, table 
6) and oxygenated hemoglobin (see figure 7, table 7).  Tukey’s post hoc tests revealed 
that all three of these fNIRS markers, (and subjective anxiety SUDS score; see figure 8, 
table 8) significantly increased between pre-speech baseline and the speech and then 
significantly decreased between the speech and the post-speech baseline within each 
hemisphere. We also found a main effect of time in the left DLPFC over BAT time-
points for deoxygenated hemoglobin levels (see figure 9, table 9), with deoxygenated 
hemoglobin significantly decreasing between pre-speech and speech time-points, and 
then significantly increasing between the speech and the post-speech baseline task. There 
was no main effect of time in the right hemisphere for deoxygenated hemoglobin. 
Hypothesized hemispheric differences in brain activity during the pre-treatment 
BAT were partially confirmed for three out of the four fNIRS markers. Additional 
Tukey’s post-hoc tests examined the time by hemisphere interaction for blood volume, 
oxygenation and deoxygenated hemoglobin during the speech phase only. During the 
speech, the right hemisphere exhibited higher levels of blood volume than the left 
hemisphere, and the left hemisphere had lower levels of deoxygenated hemoglobin than 
the right hemisphere (see figure 5, table 5 and figure 9, table 9, respectively). Post-hoc 
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tests also indicated that there were higher oxygenation levels in the left hemisphere 
during the speech task, but the difference between hemispheres was minimal.  
In sum, the results of our repeated measures ANOVAs and post-hoc tests partially 
supported our hypotheses. In support of our preliminary hypothesis, the results 
demonstrated that levels of subjective anxiety, BV, oxygenation, and oxygenated 
hemoglobin increased between the baseline date-naming task and the speech, and then 
decreased between the speech and the post-speech date-naming task within each 
hemisphere. Furthermore, deoxygenated hemoglobin decreased during the speech phase 
in comparison to pre- and post-baseline tasks.  Blood volume and deoxygenated 
hemoglobin exhibited lateralization between brain hemispheres during the active speech 
phase, but we did not see this lateralization during pre- and post-speech baseline tasks. 
3.4 Primary Analyses 
 
Hypothesis 3a:  The hypothesis that performance would improve more in the 
ACT condition relative to the CT condition was supported by the data. We used the 
interaction term from the 2 (treatment condition) x 2 (assessment point) ANOVA 
described above in hypothesis 1 to examine the interaction of time and treatment group 
on performance. As described above, there was an effect of time on objectively-rated 
speech performance; this effect was strongly moderated by treatment condition (trend; F 
(1,15) = 3.83, p =.07, ηp2 = .22) such that individuals in the ACT condition exhibited a 
larger improvement in observer-rated performance than those in the CT condition (Figure 
10). 
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Hypothesis 3b: We also hypothesized that changes in brain activation would 
differ between treatment conditions and hemispheres, anticipating that we would see 
greater reductions in activation in the ACT condition for both hemispheres.  
Using the interaction terms from a series of repeated-measures 2 (treatment 
condition) x 2 (assessment point) x 2 (hemisphere) ANOVAs, we examined the 
interaction of treatment condition, assessment point, and hemisphere on each fNIRS 
marker. Our hypothesis was partially supported for three fNIRS markers (blood volume, 
oxygenated hemoglobin, and deoxygenated hemoglobin), as described below.  
We compared speech BAT word counts to ensure that differential brain activity 
found between conditions could not be attributed to differences in verbal activity during 
the speech. There were no significant differences in word count between conditions 
during the pre- or post-treatment speeches (t = .94, p = .36, d = .44; t = .55, p = -.60, d 
= .27 respectively). Change in word production was also unaffected by condition (t = .40, 
p = .61, d = .20). 
Blood Volume: The main effect analyses from our 2 (treatment condition) x 2 
(assessment point) x 2 (hemisphere) ANOVA revealed a large trend for time (F = 1.94, p 
= .19, ηp  = .14) with levels decreasing over time. We did not find a main effect for 
hemisphere or treatment condition. Individuals experienced higher BV levels in the right 
hemisphere and individuals in the CT condition exhibited higher BV levels than those in 
the ACT condition.  
A large hemisphere by time effect was detected (at trend level) (F = 1.86, p = .20, 
ηp  = .13), with blood volume levels slightly decreasing in the ACT condition (d = .22) 
and slightly increasing in the CT condition (d = .32). There was only a small effect of 
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hemisphere by treatment condition (F = .57, p = .46, ηp  = .05) with lower BV levels in 
the ACT condition than the CT condition. The data did not support an effect for the time 
by treatment condition interaction (F = .00, p = .98, ηp  = .00). None of the above 
analyses reached statistical significance. 
An examination of effect sizes and visual inspection of the data (see figure 11) 
suggest a moderate 3-way interaction of time, condition, and hemisphere on blood 
volume level in the left (but not right) DLPFC (F = .95, p = .35, ηp  = .07), with blood 
volume decreasing in the ACT condition and increasing in the CT condition over time. 
This result supports our hypothesis that there would be hemispheric differences between 
conditions over time. 
Oxygenation: The main effect analyses from this 2 (treatment condition) x 2 
(assessment point) x 2 (hemisphere) ANOVA revealed a large effect of time (F = 11.14, 
p < .01, ηp  = .48) with oxygenation levels decreasing over time, and a large effect for 
hemisphere (F = 6.77, p = .02, ηp  = .36) with higher oxygenation levels in the left 
hemisphere. There was no main effect of treatment condition (F = .02, p = .88, ηp  = .02).  
An examination of effect sizes for the two-way interactions indicated that there 
was a moderate effect for the interaction of treatment condition by time (F = 1.11, p = .31, 
ηp  = .09) with a larger decrease in the CT condition over time, though this was not 
significant. The data did not support an effect for the interaction of time and hemisphere 
or the three-way interaction of time by condition by hemisphere (ηp  = .02 and ηp  = .03, 
respectively).  Visual inspection of these data did not reveal any notable findings. Our 
hypothesis that there would be differential changes in brain activation between treatment 
conditions and hemispheres over time was not supported for this fNIRS marker. 
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Oxygenated hemoglobin: The main effect analyses from this 2 (treatment 
condition) x 2 (assessment point) x 2 (hemisphere) ANOVA revealed large main effects 
for hemisphere and time (ηp  = .30 and ηp  = .24, respectively) with higher levels of oxy-
Hb in the left hemisphere and oxy-Hb levels decreasing over time. Only the main effect 
of hemisphere reached statistical significance. We did not find effects for treatment 
condition or any of the two-way interactions (ηp = .00 - .03). 
The data indicated a moderate effect for a three-way interaction (F = .73, p = .41, 
ηp  = .06).  Visual inspection of the data (see figure 12) indicated that greater reductions 
in oxygenated hemoglobin were seen in the ACT condition (d = .51) than the CT 
condition (d = .28) in the right DLPFC. Taken together, there was partial support for our 
hypothesis that there would be differential changes in brain activation between treatment 
conditions and hemispheres over time.  
Deoxygenated hemoglobin: Main effect and two-way interaction analyses from 
this 2 (treatment condition) x 2 (assessment point) x 2 (hemisphere) ANOVA indicated a 
very large effect for hemisphere (F = 5.13, p = .04, ηp  = .30) with lower deoxygenated 
hemoglobin in the left hemisphere. The time by treatment interaction effect was very 
large (F = 4.80, p = .05, ηp  = .30), with greater reductions in deoxygenated hemoglobin 
in the ACT condition and increases in the CT condition. The interaction effect for the 
hemisphere by time two-way interaction was also very large (F = 6.11, p = .03, ηp  = .40), 
with an increase in deoxygenated hemoglobin levels in the left hemisphere and decreases 
in deoxygenated hemoglobin levels in the right hemisphere. All other main effects and 
two-way interactions were small or absent (ηp  = .00-.05).  
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The data suggested a small effect for the three-way interaction (F = .35, p = .57, 
ηp  = .03). Though this effect was not significant, visual inspection of the data (see figure 
13) indicates that in the left DLPFC we see slightly greater increases in deoxygenated 
hemoglobin in the CT condition compared to the ACT condition. Alternatively, in the 
right hemisphere of the DLPFC, we see deoxygenated hemoglobin levels slightly 
decreasing in the ACT and slightly increasing in the CT condition (figure 14). Due to the 
small effect sizes, there is little support for the hypothesis that there are differential 
effects of treatment condition and hemisphere on brain activation for this fNIRS marker.  
As hypothesized, we found differential effects of time and treatment condition in 
the right DLPFC for oxygenated hemoglobin, with activation levels decreasing in the 
ACT condition in comparison to the CT condition. Differential effects are also seen in the 
left DLPFC for blood volume, with levels increasing in the CT condition compared to the 
ACT condition. Data did not reveal differential effects of time, treatment condition, and 
hemisphere for oxygenation and effect sizes for deoxygenated hemoglobin were small.  
Stated differently, participants in the ACT condition experienced a decrease in 
blood volume and no change in deoxygenated hemoglobin in the left DLPFC. Individuals 
in the ACT condition also exhibited decreases in oxygenated and deoxygenated 
hemoglobin in the right DLPFC. Participants in the CT condition, however, exhibited an 
increase in blood volume and deoxygenated hemoglobin in the left DLPFC. In the right 
DLPFC, individuals who underwent the CT intervention experienced an increase in 
deoxygenated hemoglobin and a decrease in oxygenated hemoglobin, though the 
decrease in oxygenated hemoglobin was smaller than the decrease seen in the ACT 
condition. 
	  65	  
 Our hypothesis of a three-way interaction between time, treatment condition, and 
hemisphere on brain activation was supported by trends in three of the four fNIRS 
markers 
3.5 Secondary Analyses 
 
 Hypothesis 4: To test the hypothesis that pre- to post-treatment reductions in 
RDLPFC brain oxygenation correspond to pre- to post-treatment reductions in subjective 
anxiety, residualized gain scores were calculated for BV, oxygenation, oxy-Hb, deoxy-
Hb and SUDS. A zero-order correlation matrix (n=14; Table 10) indicated that changes in 
self-reported anxiety were positively associated with changes in blood volume in the right 
DLPFC and negatively associated with changes in blood volume in the left DLPFC 
across both conditions. Therefore, our hypothesis was only supported in the right 
hemisphere.  
 Hypothesis 5: Residualized gain scores were also used to test the hypothesis that 
improvements in speech performance (measured by the SPS) would be associated with 
reduced activity in the right DLPFC (table 11). Minimal support was obtained for this 
hypothesis in the right hemisphere. Interestingly, reductions in oxygenation and 
oxygenated hemoglobin in the left DLPFC were moderately correlated with improvement 
in performance.  
3.6 Exploratory Analyses 
 
Mediational hypotheses 6 and 7: The small sample size precluded formal tests of 
statistical mediation.   
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
Public speaking anxiety is a common condition that can be both professionally 
and personally debilitating. Although cognitive-behavioral treatments appear to be 
effective in reducing the anxiety associated with PSA, the effect of treatment on 
performance is not well understood (Hoffman, et al., 1997). Furthermore, our 
understanding of the neurophysiological correlates of PSA has been hampered by 
measurement limitations. However, fNIRS offers a new method for examining in-vivo 
brain activity associated with public speaking anxiety and performance. 
Our study had two major aims. The first was to examine the differential impact of 
a 90-minute ACT vs. CT intervention on performance. Secondly, we investigated 
hypotheses about the neurophysiological correlates of anxiety, performance, and 
treatment condition. An additional goal was to explore the feasibility of fNIRS in an 
anxious population.  
4.1 Preliminary Findings 
 
 Overall, the data partially supported our preliminary hypothesis that brain 
activation in the right DLPFC (measured by fNIRS) is associated with anxiety. Blood 
volume levels in the right hemisphere were strongly associated with subjective anxiety, 
though the other markers were not. Furthermore, right hemispheric blood volume, 
oxygenation, and oxygenated hemoglobin all mirrored the same pattern as subjective 
anxiety levels during the course of the pre-treatment BAT assessment: increasing 
between the baseline date-naming task and the speech, and then decreasing between the 
speech and the post-speech date-naming task within each hemisphere. These results 
replicate fMRI, PET, and rTMS studies that have also reported increased blood flow and 
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oxygenation in the right DLPFC in individuals with anxiety disorders or in healthy 
controls experiencing higher levels of anxiety (Mathew, et al., 2004; Rauch, Savage, 
Alpert, Fischman, & Jenike, 1997; Schutter, Honk, d’Alfonso, Postma, and van Haan, 
2001; Wiedemann, et al., 1999).  
 Changes in self-reported anxiety were positively associated with changes in blood 
volume in the right DLPFC and unassociated with changes in blood volume in the left 
DLPFC across both treatment conditions. This replicates prior imaging studies that 
indicate a stronger relationship between anxiety and blood volume levels in the right 
hemisphere. Taken together these findings suggest that fNIRS is a valid measurement 
tool for the assessment of brain activation during anxious states. 
Support was also found for the feasibility of a 90-minute cognitive intervention 
for PSA. Participants experienced reductions in anxiety and improvements in speech 
performance following the intervention, regardless of treatment condition. Additionally, 
individuals reported that they felt that the interventions were useful and would 
recommend the treatment to a friend with similar anxiety issues. 
4.2 Primary and Secondary Findings 
 
Our primary analyses examined the differential effects of treatment condition on 
speech performance, anxiety, and fNIRS brain activation. Individuals in both groups 
experienced a decrease in objective anxiety. However, participants who received an 
acceptance-based intervention exhibited larger improvements in observer-rated 
performance during the speech than individuals who received a control-based 
intervention. The effect sizes seen in some of our analyses are striking given the low 
power of our analyses and the importance of performance improvement on the clinical 
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impact of an intervention.  
Even though all participants were still moderately anxious during the post-
treatment speech, those in the ACT condition experienced significantly greater 
improvements in their speech performance in comparison to those who received a CT-
based intervention. These results may suggest that ACT strategies are more effective than 
CT strategies at improving cognitive and motor performance during high anxiety 
situations. Whereas CT techniques like cognitive restructuring require self-focus, ACT-
based strategies may free resources for engaging in behaviors related to enhancing 
performance (e.g., concentrating on one’s speech volume, diction, vocabulary, or clarity). 
Given the potential social or occupational importance of performance in high-pressure 
and high-anxiety situations, these results suggest that ACT may be a preferable 
intervention to CT for the treatment of Public Speaking Anxiety. Differential treatment 
responses also suggest that ACT and traditional CT are distinctive interventions. 
Support for this theory continued with our analysis of brain activation between 
conditions. Individuals in the ACT condition experienced a decrease in blood volume in 
the left DLPFC. In contrast, those in the CT condition displayed an increase in blood 
volume levels in the left DLPFC. As the left hemisphere controls language and speech, 
these findings suggest that individuals in the CT condition may have been using more 
verbal processes during the post-intervention speech. As there were no significant 
differences in speech word count between treatment groups, this reduction in activation 
cannot be explained by observable verbal production. Thus, it is possible that this 
increase in the CT condition is attributable to increased un-observable verbal content 
within the brain. This increase in verbal content may use up working memory as 
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individuals focus more attention inward and away from the speech performance. 
Differences in cerebral verbal content may be driving the differential effects of speech 
performance observed between conditions. 
In the right hemisphere, individuals who underwent both the ACT and CT 
interventions exhibited decreased levels of oxygenated hemoglobin. However, the 
decrease in oxygenated hemoglobin for those in the CT condition was smaller than the 
decrease seen in the ACT condition. Prior research suggests that the right hemisphere is 
typically more active during anxious states. Thus, changes in oxygenated hemoglobin in 
the right hemisphere suggest that individuals in the ACT condition may have been less 
anxious than those in the CT condition since their right hemispheres were less active. 
However, there were no differences in reported subjective anxiety ratings between 
conditions. One potential explanation for this apparent contradiction is that individuals in 
the ACT condition were experiencing greater reductions in anxiety (explained by 
decreases in activity in the right DLPFC) but were less internally focused on these 
sensations.  
Research examining the relationship between deoxygenated hemoglobin and brain 
activation has reported mixed findings. Some studies have found that decreases in 
deoxygenated hemoglobin are associated with activation (Villringer & Chance, 1997), 
while others researchers have not reported this relationship (Wobst, Wenzel, Kohl, Obrig, 
& Villringer, 2001). Our study found mixed results for the relationship between 
deoxygenated hemoglobin and activation as well. During the pre-treatment BAT speech, 
participants experienced decreases in deoxygenated hemoglobin in the left DLPFC and 
no changes in deoxygenated hemoglobin in the right hemisphere. We expected to see 
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activation in the left hemisphere due to the use of verbal information during the speech 
phase. But if there is a relationship between decreases in deoxygenated hemoglobin, 
anxiety and brain activation we would expect to see changes in the right hemisphere as 
well. The meaning of our deoxygenated hemoglobin findings remains unclear. 
Taken together, our results support the assertion that ACT and traditional CT are 
distinctive interventions. Furthermore, they raise the possibility that acceptance-based 
treatments free-up working memory often used to regulate internal processes (e.g. 
thought suppression or reframing cognitive distortions) on both a cognitive and 
neurophysiological level in comparison to CT, which allows for greater improvements in 
behavioral performance.  
4.3 Strengths and Limitations 
 
 This study is one of the first to examine behavioral social performance as an 
outcome measure in a study comparing ACT and CT for the treatment of anxiety. 
Individuals with PSA often experience associated deficits speech performance that can 
impact their career, education, or personal success. Thus, accurately assessing treatment 
effects on social performance is a critical element of public speaking anxiety 
interventions. Self-report data is often unreliable given the cognitive biases and 
misappraisals that often exist in anxious populations, and incorporating behavioral 
measurement of anxiety and performance often minimizes the biases introduced by self-
report assessments (Leserman & Koch, 1993). Utilizing both objective and subjective 
measures in the same protocol can create a clearer picture of the effect of treatment on the 
primary outcomes (e.g. performance) of most interest to clients and clinicians. 
This study is also one of the first to examine changes in brain activation in a PSA 
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population, and to compare changes in brain activation between treatment interventions. 
These aims reflect the current cutting-edge research in the field, which is beginning to 
address the neurophysiological correlates of psychopathology and its treatment. The 
detection of differential neurophysiological changes between ACT and CT in this study 
supports the continued examination of ACT as a distinctive intervention for the treatment 
of psychological conditions. 
Although this study was able to demonstrate the utility of an fNIRS in individuals 
with PSA and suggests noteworthy differences between ACT and CT after a brief 
intervention, there are several limitations to consider when interpreting the results. First, 
because the study was developed as a pilot investigation, it had a relatively small number 
of participants and was underpowered to test many of our hypotheses. Some of our 
results and conclusions are based on effect sizes or visual inspection of data without 
formal statistical tests. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that right-sided prefrontal activity has been linked 
to task novelty (Goldberg, 2009); therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the increased right 
DLPFC activation levels were caused by processes related to the novel date-naming and 
speech tasks. However, given the differential effects between treatment groups, it is 
unlikely that the increases in activity within the right DLPFC were due to task novelty 
alone. 
There are also important drawbacks associated with the limited depth perception 
of the fNIRS technology. The fNIRS device is not able to provide activation data for the 
entire brain. Given the importance of the limbic system in the expression of anxiety, our 
inability to examine these structures may limit our understanding of the full subcortical 
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neurophysiological picture associated with these findings. Additionally, because fNIRS is 
a relatively new technology, there are currently several versions of the fNIRS device and 
few procedural guidelines to dictate the use of each apparatus. Researchers are still 
determining the best way to reduce and interpret fNIRS data. However the benefits of 
using fNIRS, including the unique ability to examine in-vivo prefrontal brain activation 
during behavioral tasks, may outweigh these limitations. 
Recently, a small group of biomedical engineers have asserted that fNIR 
technology only measures changes within the blood vessels of the skin and is not capable 
of examining hemodynamic changes in the brain. These researchers cite their study 
results showing that fNIRS signals disappear when forehead skin blood flow is blocked 
by pressure (see Takahashi et al., 2011). As skin hemodynamic changes are uniform 
throughout the forehead, the hemispheric differences found in our study seem to counter 
this fNIRS criticism. 
 Lastly, this study did not incorporate a third experimental condition to serve as a 
no-treatment control group. This prevents us from determining how performance and 
brain activation would have changed in a group with PSA and no formal intervention. 
4.4 Clinical Implications and Future Directions 
 
Continued investigation into the neurological correlates of public speaking 
anxiety and its treatment may help explain why some individuals experience significant 
anxiety in public speaking situations, and provide a better understanding of the brain 
mechanisms associated with speech anxiety. Research examining the differential patterns 
of brain arousal may eventually help us to determine whether baseline brain patterns 
predict differential response to cognitive interventions. 
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Additionally, our results suggest that a brief 90-minute cognitive intervention can 
reduce anxiety and improve performance in a clinical public speaking phobic sample. 
Future research could devote resources to developing and examining the long-term 
efficacy and utility of a brief intervention for PSA, as a condensed treatment package 
would greatly improve treatment dissemination. 
Future studies examining the biological basis of public speaking anxiety may also 
want to consider utilizing a control group to allow for the comparison of ACT and CT to 
a no-treatment control condition in the examination of behavioral and fNIRS changes. 
No-treatment groups are especially important given the high prevalence of PSA in non-
clinical populations, and future studies should examine behavioral and 
neurophysiological differences between normal and pathological PSA.  
Our results will hopefully encourage an examination of these same hypotheses in 
a larger sample to ensure proper statistical power for all analyses. Although large sample 
sizes in brain imagining studies are rare, the low-cost and safety of fNIRS technology 
may aid in the recruitment of larger samples. This would allow for mediation and 
moderation analyses, and a greater understanding of the neurophysiological 
underpinnings of public speaking anxiety and the effect of treatment interventions.  
Finally, it would be interesting to follow participants over a longer period of time 
following the cognitive interventions to examine long-term hemodynamic and cognitive 
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Table 1. List of proposed measures and estimated time to complete. 










Demographics Form  5 minutes X   
SCID – Social Anxiety Disorder Section ~10 10 minutes X   
ADIS – Screen and Social Phobia Section ~50 15 minutes X   
Clinical Global Impression – Severity 
Scale (CGI-S) 
1 < 1 minute X   
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory 10 < 1 minute X   
Controlled Oral Word Association Test  5 minutes  X  
Philadelphia Area Familiarity Scale  < 1 minute  X  
Behavioral Assessment Test (BAT) n/a 8 minutes  X X 
Subjective Units of Discomfort Scale 
(SUDS) 
3 2 minutes  X X 
Speech Performance Scale (SPS) 17 3 – 5 
minutes 
 X X 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – State 
Scale (STAI-S) 
20 3 – 5 
minutes 
 X X 
Personal Report of Confidence as a 
Speaker (PRCS) 
12 3 – 5 
minutes 
 X X 
Self-Statements During Public Speaking 
(SSPS) 
10 3 – 5 
minutes 
 X X 
Personal Report of Communication 
Apprehension (PRCA-24) 
24 3 – 5 
minutes 
 X X 
Drexel Defusion Scale 15 10 minutes  X X 
Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale 10 3 – 5 
minutes 
 X X 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II 
(AAQ-II) 
10 3 – 5 
minutes 
 X X 
Reaction to Treatment Questionnaire 
(RTQ) 
17 3 – 5 
minutes 






Table 2: Repeated-Measures ANOVA Examining Pre- to Post-Treatment Changes in Self-Reported Anxiety 
(Measured by Subjective Units of Discomfort, or SUDS) and Observer-Rated Anxiety (Measured by Speech 
Performance Scale, or SPS) 
 








F values 60.45** 31.64** 19.03* 
Effect Size (ηp2) .80 .69 .49 











Table 3: Zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationships between a) residualized change scores of 
fNIRS values and subjective anxiety and b) fNIRS values and observer-rated anxiety 
 
 Right Blood 
Volume 
Right Oxygenated 








r = .52* r = .01 r =  .23 r = .22 
Observer-rated 
anxiety 
r = .21 r =.09 r = -.12 r =  .16 
     
 Left Blood 
Volume 
Left Oxygenated 








r = .21 r = .39 r =  -.01 r = .32 
Observer-rated 
anxiety 
r = -.13 r = -.06 r = -.34 r =  .06 







Table 4: Main effects of 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA examining fNIRS marker changes in the 
Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (DLPFC) during the pre-treatment Behavioral Assessment Test 
 
Main Effect of Time F p ηp2 
Blood Volume 19.56 < .001 .57 
Oxygenation 32.59 < .001 .67 
Oxygenated 
Hemoglobin 
19.63 < .001 .57 
Deoxygenated 
Hemoglobin 
2.81 .08 .17 
    
Main Effect of 
Hemisphere 
F p ηp2 
Blood Volume 2.45 .14 .14 
Oxygenation 2.45 .14 .14 
Oxygenated 
Hemoglobin 
.68 .42 .04 
Deoxygenated 
Hemoglobin 










Table 5: Post-hoc analyses of blood volume changes in the Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (DLPFC) 
during the pre-treatment Behavioral Assessment Test 
 
Simple Main Effect of Time Within Each Hemisphere F ηp2 
Right Hemisphere 24.11** .62 
Left Hemisphere 7.45* .33 
   
 M SD 
Pre-speech left DLPFC .19 .76 
Pre-speech right DLPFC .66 1.26 
Speech left DLPFC 1.75 2.15 
Speech right DLPFC 3.12 2.55 
Post-speech left DLPFC -.28 .90 
Post-speech right DLPFC -.40 1.00 








Table 6: Post-hoc analyses of changes in oxygenation within the Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (DLPFC) 
during the pre-treatment Behavioral Assessment Test 
 
Simple Main Effect of Time Within Each Hemisphere F ηp2 
Right Hemisphere 24.65** .62 
Left Hemisphere 38.55** .72 
   
 M SD 
Pre-speech left DLPFC .50 .68 
Pre-speech right DLPFC .69 .76 
Speech left DLPFC 3.39 1.74 
Speech right DLPFC 2.82 1.77 
Post-speech left DLPFC -.09 .68 
Post-speech right DLPFC -.25 .91 








Table 7: Post-hoc analyses of changes in oxygenated hemoglobin within the Dorsolateral Prefrontal 
Cortex (DLPFC) during the pre-treatment Behavioral Assessment Test 
 
Simple Main Effect of Time Within Each Hemisphere F ηp2 
Right Hemisphere 9.54** .39 
Left Hemisphere 20.91** .58 
   
 M SD 
Pre-speech left DLPFC .47 .77 
Pre-speech right DLPFC .66 .92 
Speech left DLPFC 2.65 1.82 
Speech right DLPFC 2.61 1.77 
Post-speech left DLPFC -.18 .74 
Post-speech right DLPFC .218 2.08 









Table 8: Changes in Subjective Units of Discomfort (SUDS) during the pre-treatment Behavioral 
Assessment Test 
 
 t d 
Pre-speech to speech SUDS 8.86** 1.50 
Speech to post-speech SUDS 8.56** 1.78 
Pre-speech to post-speech SUDS 1.16 0.19 








Table 9: Post-hoc analyses of changes in deoxygenated hemoglobin within the Dorsolateral Prefrontal 
Cortex (DLPFC) during the pre-treatment Behavioral Assessment Test 
 
Simple Main Effect of Time Within Each Hemisphere F ηp2 
Right Hemisphere .07 .01 
Left Hemisphere 5.84** .28 
   
 M SD 
Pre-speech left DLPFC -.02 .80 
Pre-speech right DLPFC -.03 .57 
Speech left DLPFC -.76 .72 
Speech right DLPFC -.06 .80 
Post-speech left DLPFC -.08 .31 
Post-speech right DLPFC -.07 .50 










Table 10: Zero-order correlations between treatment changes in brain oxygenation in the DLPFC and 




Blood Volume      Oxygenated 
     Hemoglobin  





r = .26 
p =.38 
r = -.01 
p =.98 
r = -.29 
p = .32 
r = .25 
p = .39 
Left Dorsolateral 
Prefrontal Cortex 
Blood Volume      Oxygenated 
     Hemoglobin  





r = -.27 
p =.34 
 r = -.11 
        p =.70 
r = -.32 
p = .27 
r = .15 











Table 11: Zero-order correlations between treatment changes in brain oxygenation in the DLPFC and 




Blood Volume      Oxygenated 
     Hemoglobin  





r = -.13 
p =.66 
r = -.04 
        p =.90 
r = .11 
p = .72 
r = -.16 
p = .59 
Left Dorsolateral 
Prefrontal Cortex 
Blood Volume      Oxygenated 
     Hemoglobin  





r = -.08 
p = .80 
r = -.32 
p = .27 
r = .13 
p = .68 
r = -.38 














*Due to equipment malfunctions, there are different sample sizes for different analyses (e.g. fNIRS 
analyses vs. performance analyses). 
 
 











Figure 2: Study Design 
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Figure 3.  Proposed model of mediation examining whether baseline levels of blood volume, oxygenated 
hemoglobin, deoxygenated hemoglobin, or oxygenation in the right and left hemispheres mediate the 













Figure 4.  Proposed model of mediation examining whether individual levels of acceptance and defusion 











Figure 5: Blood volume changes in the Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (DLPFC) during the pre-treatment 


































Figure 6: Changes in oxygenation within the Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (DLPFC) during the pre-
































Figure 7: Changes in oxygenated hemoglobin within the Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (DLPFC) during 




















































































Figure 9: Changes in deoxygenated hemoglobin within the Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (DLPFC) 














































Figure 10: Interaction of treatment condition (standard Cognitive Therapy (CT) vs. Acceptance and 
















































Figure 11: Interaction of treatment condition (standard Cognitive Therapy (CT) vs. Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT)) and time (pre- to post-treatment) on blood volume in the left dorsolateral 










































Figure 12: Interaction of treatment condition (standard Cognitive Therapy (CT) vs. Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT)) and time (pre- to post-treatment) on oxygenated hemoglobin in the right 






































Figure 13: Interaction of treatment condition (standard Cognitive Therapy (CT) vs. Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT)) and time (pre- to post-treatment) on deoxygenated hemoglobin in the left 






































Figure 14: Interaction of treatment condition (standard Cognitive Therapy (CT) vs. Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT)) and time (pre- to post-treatment) on deoxygenated hemoglobin in the right 









































Figure 15: Association between (residualized) pre-post change in right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC) oxygenation levels and (residualized) pre-post change in SUDS by fNIRS marker and treatment 






















































Figure 16: Interaction of treatment condition (standard Cognitive Therapy (CT) vs. Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT)) and time (pre- to post-treatment) on deoxygenated hemoglobin in the right 






















































Introduction to Procedure (2 minutes) 
§  “You have just completed a public speaking exercise for the first time. You are 
going to be asked to perform this exercise once more today in about 90 minutes. 
During the next hour and a half, we will discuss and practice some specific 
anxiety management strategies for you to use when you perform your speech 
again.  These strategies are based on a principle known as “psychological 
acceptance,” meaning you will learn to notice, but not fight, your anxiety 
sensations and any thoughts that go along with them. What psychologists have 
learned is that by noticing and accepting anxious thoughts and feelings, you will 
be able to cope better than you would by fighting them. One result is that you 
have more mental resources to devote to focusing on what it is you want to say 
and your speaking performance improves.” 
§ “We have used this strategy for people with public speaking anxiety in the past, 
and it has worked very well. We’ve found that individuals who use these 
strategies are more likely to accept the uncomfortable sensations associated with 
speaking in public, tend to focus more on their speech performance and less on 
their anxiety, and have been able to do things that used to be avoided.” 
§ “As I’m going through these ideas and strategies, make sure to ask me any 
questions you may have about anything we discuss, okay?” 
Rationale for treatment: exposure in the context of acceptance/defusion  (3 minutes) 
§ “There are 4 main points that we’re going to discuss and practice in this session 
that will teach you how to cope with public speaking anxiety. These points are all 
tied together, and we will talk about them in more detail in a few minutes” 
o “1 – Acceptance that anxiety is a natural and harmless reaction that often 
occurs in situations such as public speaking.  Although anxiety is harmless, 
we have a natural instinct to try to control it or get rid of it.  However, 
attempts to do so usually backfire.  For the most part, humans do not have 
the ability to control their emotions, including anxiety.  So, trying to control 
anxiety only draws out attention to it, reinforces the notion that it is awful, 
and prevents us from fully engaging in life, achieving our aims and 
performing to the best of our ability.  By the way, “acceptance” does not 
mean “resignation” but a much more active process of welcoming and being 
open to your internal experiences.  Do you see the difference?  How would 
you explain, in your words?”  [Refine, as necessary.] 
o “2 – Gentle Refocusing your attention.  This involves noticing when you’re 
focusing your attention on your anxious thoughts and emotions, or on how 
you are coming across, and gently redirecting your attention to the most 
relevant aspects of whatever it is you are trying to accomplish.  Refocusing 
happens continuously.  So, when you’re giving a speech, you might 
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continuously refocus on what it is you want to say and an important public 
speaking skill like making eye contact.” 
o “3 – Willingness to focus outwardly on speaking, rather than internally on 
anxiety and uncomfortable sensations” 
o “4 – Defusion – bringing some distance between yourself and your thoughts, 
allowing you to recognize thoughts as just thoughts, and not necessarily as 
reflections of the way things really are.”  
§ “Ultimately, this is about learning how to engage fully in the behaviors that matter 
most to you, instead of being forced to expend energy trying to control your 
anxiety or avoiding experiences altogether” 
Introduce concept of exposure (3 minutes) 
§ “’Exposure’ refers to confronting situations that you fear (in this case, public 
speaking situations).” 
o ASK: “Why do you think exposure is important?” – elicit from participant 
• “Opportunity to practice behaviors and strategies in a safe 
environment.  This includes identifying aspects of public speaking that 
need extra attention.  For example, if you are whispering when you 
speak, we would be able to help you practice speaking at a more 
audible volume” 
• “Practice accepting internal experiences without struggling with them, 
trying to suppress them, or otherwise change or get rid of them.” 
• “Redirecting attention.  When your mind starts focusing on your how 
your feeling, you can learn to gently refocus your attention on the 
speech.  This doesn’t mean you’re getting rid of the anxiety symptoms.  
Rather, you’re just paying less attention to them, and instead focusing 
your attention on the task at hand.” 
o “Exposure often does produce “habituation” which means that your body 
and mind learn that nothing awful happens when you are engaged in the 
feared activity and so you gradually react less anxiously.  However, there is 
no way to know how much anxiety reduction you will experience, or when 
it will happen, or when it might come back.  So, making anxiety reduction a 
goal turns out to be a bad idea.  Plus, depending on anxiety reduction and 
hoping for it leads to the troubles were just discussing: you’ll dislike your 
anxiety, you’ll focus on trying to control it, and you won’t be able to 
perform as well or be as engaged in your life.  These are the reasons we 
emphasize the importance of accepting whatever thoughts, feelings, 
sensations, etc. your mind and body happen to generate at any given time.  
We will discuss all this more later,, but I’m interested to hear what you’re 
getting from what we’ve talked about so far.”  [Solicit a summary of main 
points covered so far.  Prompt and then fill in as needed.] 
 
1. “Creative hopelessness” (3 minutes) 
• “What have you tried to do in the past to get rid of your anxiety when you give a 
speech?”  Examples of typical strategies, use as needed: 
o Avoidance 
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o Trying to distract/calm self 
o Trying to suppress anxiety-related thoughts/feelings/sensations 
o Trying “popular” strategies (e.g. imagining the audience naked) 
• Emphasize strategies that focus on experiential control.  Ask the patient to 
evaluate how well these have or have not worked.  Point out that these control-
oriented strategies have not consistently worked (otherwise the participant would 
not be seeking help). 
 
Control as the Problem: (5 minutes)  
• “Try this: I’m going to be watching you very closely, but I want you to close your 
eyes. You can think about anything you want right now, but just don’t think at all 
about how I’m watching you. You can think about anything you want, I’ll let you 
know when you can stop” (wait 15-30 seconds). “Suppose I offered a 1 million 
dollar reward to anyone who could do this, and I wired you up to a mind-reading 
machine to verify if you could control your thoughts enough not to think about me 
watching you.  What do you think would happen?” 
o “What do you think these examples are meant to illustrate?” As much as 
possible the therapist should gently guide the client toward the conclusion.  
o “This example shows that we cannot control our thoughts even when we 
have the most intense motivation to do so” 
o “We are taught from a young age that we can control our mind.  However, 
psychologists now realize that attempts to control our thoughts are most 
likely not going to be successful and may even make things worse, 
especially in stressful situations.  Can you think of an example where an 
attempt to control a distressing thought or feeling made it even worse?  
o Here is another example (if needed): “Imagine you are hooked up to a 
machine that can measure your anxiety. It’s the world’s best polygraph 
machine, and it is impossible to fool; if you’re feeling anxious, it will know.  
Now, imagine that if your anxiety reaches a 7 out of 10, the machine will 
automatically shoot you. Do you think you would be able to keep your 
anxiety from reaching a 7?”  
o “In the same way that we generally can’t control negative thoughts, we also 
can’t directly control our feelings. This applies to thoughts and feelings 
that you will experience when giving a speech in front of other people. In 
fact, trying to control your thoughts about the anxiety and performance will 
actually interfere with our ability to give a good speech. The acceptance 
strategies I am about to teach you will give you another way to deal with the 
anxiety without struggling with your thoughts and feelings.”  
** 15 minute time-check** 
2. Alternative to control (8 minutes) “So, if controlling anxiety is not the answer, 
you’re probably wondering what a possible alternative strategy looks like… “ 
• Tug-of-war with a monster: “The struggle between you and your anxiety in 
public speaking situations is like being in a tug-of-war with a monster. Imagine 
that you are standing on one side of a cliff, and across from you is a monster—a 
big, hairy, scary monster that represents all of your anxiety. In between you and 
the monster is a bottomless ravine. You and the monster each hold one end of the 
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rope and are pulling back and forth, each trying to pull the other into the ravine, 
but you never can quite pull the monster in (i.e., you can’t get rid of the anxiety).  
In fact, the harder you pull, the harder the monster pulls, and you feel yourself 
slipping ever closer to the edge of the cliff.” 
o ASK: “What is the alternative?”  
• “The alternative to controlling anxiety is to “drop the rope” and allow 
the monster (anxiety) to exist, which frees you up to act in accordance 
with your values and goals, like being able to speak in a public 
situation” (speak at the wedding, apply for the promotion – use 
examples specific to this individual) 
• “What happens to the monster when you drop the rope?  Does he go 
away?”  
o Point out how he can be on the edge of the ravine and make 
himself very noticeable  by shouting and gesturing.  Connect to 
anxiety.  
• “Does he change in any way?”   …  
o Perhaps he gets louder at first, like a child having a tantrum?  
Different people will have different answers. 
• “Does your sense of him change?”  …   
o Point out that most likely you will find him less threatening, and 
pay less attention to him.  There may be more times that you 
barely notice him.  Then he’ll unexpectedly seem louder again.  
Connect to anxiety.]   
• “How does dropping the rope affect the rest of your life?”  …  
o Point out how you now have hands free!  And your mind free!  
You can do so many more things, and can do them more 
mindfully.]     
• “If you decide to drop the rope, how long will you stay in this 
mindset?” 
o Point out that dropping the rope is not a single act, but rather a 
process that must be repeated on an ongoing basis.  
• You may have to drop the rope hundreds of times a day, especially at 
first.] 
o ASK: “So how does this relate to public speaking anxiety? 
• “This metaphor is equivalent to being able to notice that you’re having 
anxious thoughts and feelings, and accept the fact that you can have 
these feelings without engaging in a struggle with them. You are 
spending so much time and energy struggling with these anxious 
thoughts and feelings that you cannot change, suppress or avoid 
(you’ve tried so hard to control them!). While engaged in this struggle 
you are so focused inwardly that you lose the ability to make choices 
and decisions about your life and move towards your goals/values 
(speaking in public/at weddings, etc.).”  
• Can use soldiers metaphor – brain attention is 100 soldiers… if 90 of 
your soldiers are monitoring your anxiety, thoughts, etc. then you only 
have 10 soldiers working on your speech. Goal is to get more of those 
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soldiers concerned about the speech, and fewer monitoring your 
internal experiences 
o Acceptance: “So going back to what we were speaking about before…if we 
don’t try to control or suppress our anxiety what can we do?  Perhaps it 
could help us to accept that we are going to have this anxiety no matter 
what; we can’t stop our mind and body from getting anxious. That’s not a 
viable choice.  However, there are two things we *do* have a choice about.  
First, we can choose whether we have a controlling and judgmental mindset 
towards our anxiety, or an open, accepting stance.  Second, we can choose 
our *behavior*.  For example, you can choose to speak aloud and make eye 
contact at the same time you have anxious feelings and thoughts that push 
you not to do so. The more you just notice and accept the thoughts and 
sensations the easier it will be to keep going, perform well, and not to spend 
so much time focusing on your these internal sensations.” 
o “What do I mean by internal experiences?  Things like your thoughts: “They 
think I’m stupid.”  “They can tell that I’m anxious.”  “I did so badly.”  
Another type of internal experience is feelings, including emotions like 
sadness, anxiety and excitement.  Thoughts and feelings about giving a 
speech are internal experiences. So are physical feelings like a racing heart, 
sweaty palms, or a reddened face” 
o “If you are non-accepting of your anxiety and internal experiences (i.e., you 
are struggling with them rather than accepting them), you are essentially 
unwilling to choose the behaviors that are in line with your goals without 
first neutralizing your anxiety. As we have seen, this actually reduces your 
control over your behavior and the choices that you make, and you expend 
all of your mental energy focusing inward on this fight with your emotions.” 
o “The important point is that we don’t need to get rid of anxiety in order to 
behave however we want to (i.e., give a speech).  Anxiety only stops us if 
we let it.  As we learn to let the anxiety be there and give up the struggle 
with it, we are free to behave however we want.  You take charge of your 
behavior, rather than letting anxiety be in the driver’s seat.  Although this 
idea may seem counterintuitive, it really does work!” 
o “So, what are you getting out of our conversation so far?”  [Add to, refine, 
as necessary]  
 
3. Willingness: (8 minutes) “So how do we move towards this attitude of acceptance 
towards our distressing thoughts and feelings when they are so stressful and so real? 
• “The idea of dropping the rope in the tug-of-war with the anxiety monster means 
that you are accepting that your anxiety as a natural response. When you drop the 
rope, it means that you are WILLING to feel uncomfortable and change your 
behavior. Willingness implies flexibility to behave however you want to, not only 
in those narrow ways that supposedly protect us from uncomfortable thoughts and 
feelings. 
• Two dials metaphor: “Imagine that there are two dials, like the volume and 
balance settings on your stereo, which are an important part of your 
discomfort experience. One dial, with a 0-10 range, is the anxiety associated 
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with speaking in public. You came in here mainly because you wanted help 
dealing with that dial.  But as we’ve seen, you actually have limited (if any) 
direct control over that dial, and the more you focus on it the more you are 
bothered by the anxiety.  It’s as if the dial on your stereo looked like it was 
functional, but was really broken.  But there is another dial that is the more 
important of the two. In fact, it is the only one you can control. This one is 
called Willingness. It refers to how open you are to internal experiences, 
without trying to manipulate them, escape them, or change them. When the 
difficult part of standing in front of a group and speaking is at a 10, and 
you’re trying hard to make that difficulty go away, your willingness is a 0.  
That is a really bad combination, because you become so bothered by all of 
that difficulty – by thoughts of failure, embarrassment, and anxiety. Trying 
to find ways around that discomfort just doesn’t work, which is why you’re 
here today. So we aren’t going to focus on the agenda of how to make 
speaking in public anxiety-free, because that agenda won’t get us very far.” 
o “Instead, we are going to focus on the Willingness dial. If we set your 
Willingness high, then your discomfort isn’t necessarily going to go 
away, but you are free to choose the behaviors that you want to engage 
in and not be limited by avoiding anxiety.”  
o (Be careful to attend to the patient’s natural tendency to view willingness 
within the context of the control agenda. “So if I’m willing to have the 
anxiety it will go away.”  
o ‘True willingness instead means that the anxiety is not only free to occur, 
but in fact is welcome – and will not change the behaviors that you decide to 
engage in” 
• Cards Exercise: Throw cards at the individual while trying to engage 
them in conversation having them 1. Trying to catch all cards (control) 2. 
Trying to bat away all cards (avoid) 3. Ignoring cards (acceptance). 
Discuss this as the exercise unfolds, and ask them for their reaction 
afterwards 
 
Values (4 minutes) 
• Core metaphor:  “Values are like compass points.  They indicate a direction in 
which to move, but are not destinations.  One can move “east,” but no matter how 
far one travels, one never gets to “East.”  Goals, on the other hand, are potentially 
attainable destinations (like mile markers) along the path in the direction of values.  
The important thing is that one’s goals be consistent with one’s values.” 
• “Given that you’re here today, speaking in public is important to you.  What are 
some of your personal values that explain why public speaking is important to 
you, and why it is worth it to you to work towards a goal of being able to more 
often and more completely express yourself publicly?” 
o [Help as necessary connect top-level values with the goal of being a better and 
more frequent public speaker.] 
 
**** Exposure Activity (10 minutes) – Two, 2-minute speeches  
•  “I’m going to ask you to stand up and give a two-minute speech on your favorite 
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foods. I will let you know when to stop. As you anticipate and then start your 
speech, try, as best as you can, to *welcome* the anxious thoughts you have 
about what your audience is thinking or how your body is responding rather than 
hating them and wanting them to go away.” – 
• Both exposures will be on this same topic 
• Briefly debrief with them about this experience, how difficult it was, how the 
participant thought their performance was. Encourage them to keep working on 
this through all exposures, and reinforce how hard this is. 
 
**35 minute time-check** 
 
 
4. Defusion/Distancing: (10 minutes) –  
• “A huge part of learning how to focus your attention outwardly is practicing 
techniques that help you direct your attention away from your internal 
experiences”  
o “Try to just sit back and notice whatever internal experiences you are having 
right this second.  What do you see, hear, smell, feel?  What are you 
thinking? How about when you’re in a public speaking situation?” 
• “One reason is can be so difficult to accept our anxious thoughts and feelings is 
that we experience them as if they were part of us and as if they were a literal 
truth rather than as an experience we just happen to be having in a particular 
moment.  Psychologists call this being “fused” with thoughts and feelings.  This 
means that when the thought “I am making a fool of myself!” comes into mind, 
we view it as literally true, rather than just a thought that our mind happened to 
create in that second.” 
• “A very important way to decrease the distress you have about these thoughts and 
feelings is to achieve DE-fusion, or to distance yourself psychologically, from 
them.  When we achieve distance from our emotions, feelings, and concerns we 
can take a step back from ourselves. We can actually see ourselves experiencing 
the anxiety from a psychological distance. When we are distanced we can 
experience anxiety (or any thought or feeling) as just a thought and/or feeling our 
mind is having at that moment.  It can help to think of your anxiety as a sensation 
- nothing more than chemical and electrical activity in our brain.  When we have 
this kind of distance from our thoughts and feelings we can choose not to do what 
those thoughts and feelings are ‘telling’ us to do.  In other words, we can say: ‘I 
can see myself experiencing anxiety right now.  It’s is a really intense sensation.  
Hmm, that’s interesting.  I’m going to let that feeling just be and choose not to 
fight it.’    In the same way, we can step back and see ourselves thinking a thought 
like “I am making a fool of myself!” and can say to ourselves, “Right now I’m 
having the thought ‘I am making a fool of myself.’” 
o “Using a couple of little verbal conventions will help to undermine the 
tendency for words/thoughts to pull us into a struggle.” 
o “Name the type of language being used by saying “I’m having the 
(thought/feeling/evaluation/bodily sensation) that....” If you name the 
process, it’s easier to see what it really is, rather than what it just says it is. 
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It’s also an important step in starting to be AWARE of your thoughts and 
feelings, and just notice them.” 
o Give an example of a thought related to public speaking and how to 
reformulate it. Examples: “I’m going to mess up. Everyone can tell that I 
am sweating and shaking. I am so terrible at speaking to a group.” 
§ Reformulate: “I’m having the thought that I will mess up. My body is 
experiencing sweating and trembling sensations, and I have the belief 
that others are aware of this. I am evaluating my public speaking skills 
as terrible.  Hmm.  Those are interesting thoughts.  Hello thoughts; 
welcome aboard.  You guys just do your thing, and I’m going to focus 
on my speech now.” 
• ASK: participant to explain defusion in his own words.  Ask him/her to give 
examples of thoughts he has had regarding public speaking, and to reformulate 
them. 
 
**** Exposure Activity (10 minutes) – Two, 2-minute speeches, giving speech despite 
therapist verbalizing anxious thoughts every 20 seconds.   
• ““Please stand up and give a two-minute speech on what you would do if you 
won the lottery. I am going to act like your mind, saying the anxious thoughts 
that you have out loud while you are talking. Try your best to practice defusion 
techniques. Keep trying to maintain your attention outwardly on your speech, 
even as I speak your thoughts while you’re giving your speech. Keep going until 
I tell you to stop.” –  
• Repeat this exposure and instructions TWICE, with the second speech on a 
current political/controversial issue of their choice. 
• Debrief, discussing both moments when the client was able to achieve defusion, 
acceptance, and willingness, as well as times when he/she “picked up the rope” 
and struggled with thoughts and feelings. 
 
Gentle Refocusing (5 minutes) 
• “What do you do if you catch myself paying too much attention to trying to 
control your anxiety or thinking about what other people are thinking?”  
§ “A helpful strategy can be gentle refocusing.  When your attention has moved 
from a conversation to yourself/your performance (which, of course, will 
inevitably happen), you can gently redirect it back to the conversation.  You can 
do this as many times as necessary; it doesn’t matter whether it is 10 or 20 or 100 
times.  The keys are:  
(1) to become aware that you have lost your focus so that you can gently 
refocus your attention back to the task at hand; 
(2) not to be judgmental or distressed that you have lost focus; 
(3) not to get caught up in arguing with/changing/suppressing any of the ideas 
related to your performance/how others are viewing you.  Instead just let them 
be, and gently refocus; 
(4) Gentle refocusing is different from thought suppression (e.g., trying not to 
think about me watching you); 
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(5) Acknowledge that you don’t have complete control over where you direct 
your attention (one reason not to be angry at yourself when attention is not 
where you want it to be), and just do the best you can to move your focus back 
to the conversation as soon as you realize it has shifted.” 
• If necessary: review, expand on acceptance-based model for why 
participant tends to focus inwardly & how this doesn’t work 
o Practice 1: Standing on Chair.  “The more your mind is concerned with 
how you are being perceived by others, the more difficult the refocusing can 
be.  So, let’s try a quick practice. Most people feel awkward standing on a 
chair in the presence of another person, so hopefully you will too!  See what 
it’s like to experience the natural pull towards concerns about how you seem 
to another person, yet still redirecting your attention.  Are you ready?” …. 
Have the individual stand on the chair and gently refocus attention from 
thoughts about being watched/anxiety to more pleasant stimuli 
 
****Exposure Activity (10 minutes) – Two, 2 minute speeches practicing gentle 
refocusing of attention from anxiety back to speech – acceptance of feelings of anxiety, 
doesn’t have to control behavior/speech – done while standing on a chair 
• ““Please stand up and give a two-minute speech on your favorite book or TV 
show. Try to keep your attention focused outwardly on your speech, the words 
you choose, the volume and tone of your voice, and other aspects of your 
performance. If you notice that you’re starting to focus inward, on your internal 
sensations and thoughts, gently notice this and refocus your attention back on 
your performance. Keep trying to maintain your attention outwardly on your 
speech, even if you need to keep redirecting your attention. Keep going until I 
tell you to stop.” –  
• Repeat this exposure and instructions TWICE, with the second speech on a 
description of their immediate family. 
 
 
Review key concepts (acceptance, defusion, willingness) (2 min)  
• “As a way to help you remember what we just talked about, we have come up 
with a memory aid. Use the word DRAW. 
D: Defusion/Distancing. Step back from your thoughts and feelings about 
public speaking. See them from a distance. “I see myself having a feeling of 
anxiety right now.” 
R: Refocusing. Gently directing attention towards a speech and lessening 
self-focused attention  
A: Acceptance. Whatever thoughts or feelings your mind creates are okay.  
You can just accept them as they are and let them be there while you focus on 
the task at hand. 
W: Willingness. Be willing to have what your mind gives you and to behave 
how you want. No matter how high your anxiety level is, you can let it be 
while you go ahead and give a speech. You don’t have to make it go away. 
 
**** 2 Exposure Activities (10 minutes) – practicing all strategies used with time for 
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discussion. 
• ““Please stand up and give another two-minute speech on your favorite holiday. 
Try to incorporate all of the strategies we’ve discussed today – acceptance, 
willingness, defusion, and gentle refocusing. Use these skills to try and keep your 
attention focused on your speech performance, not on your internal experiences. 
I’ll let you know when to stop” –  
• Repeat this exposure and instructions TWICE, with the second speech on their 






Introduction to Procedure (3 minutes) 
 
• “You have just completed a public speaking exercise for the first time. You are 
going to be asked to perform this exercise once more today about 90 minutes from 
now. During the next hour and a half we will discuss and practice some specific 
anxiety management strategies for you to use when you do the public speaking 
task again.   
•  “These strategies focus on exploring how different behaviors, thoughts, and 
feelings interact. The goal is to investigate which particular thoughts and beliefs 
are maintaining or increasing your anxiety, because the way we feel and behave is 
defined by the way we think.  When your thoughts are out of line with reality (for 
example, when they exaggerate the likelihood or the importance of a negative 
outcome), they can make you anxious and influence the decisions you make and 
ultimately your behavior.  We’re going to evaluate the way you think, and try to 
bring your thoughts more in line with reality. Past research indicates that 
individuals who become highly anxious in public speaking situations tend to 
believe that they are in social danger. The mind and body perceive this danger in 
the same way as actual life-or-death danger, and they react in a similar way. If we 
can test the validity of these anxious thoughts and restructure them based on valid 
evidence, your feelings and physical reactions should change as well, resulting in 
your being less anxious. 
• “The ability to evaluate and adjust thinking is particularly important since people 
with anxiety typically think in ways that actually maintain their anxiety in public 
speaking situations, and maintains their distress over time. Specifically, people 
with high anxiety tend to overestimate the likelihood of experiencing negative 
outcomes, like getting up to speak and not having anything to say. Even more 
importantly, these individuals tend to see these negative outcomes as having a 
much greater cost than do people with low anxiety. So for example, you may 
think that people who see you as nervous during a speech will think you are 
unprepared or incompetent. We will discuss some of these beliefs directly, but the 
best way to test out their validity is through experience. As you begin to put 
yourself in public speaking situations, we want to help you shift in your beliefs 
about how likely your feared outcomes are and also in your ability to handle them 
if they were to occur.”  
• “As we work together over the next 90 minutes, please ask me any questions you 
may have about anything we discuss, okay?” 
Psychoeduation regarding public speaking anxiety (2 min) 
 
• “Anxiety is a “fight or flight” response. This makes total sense in the context of 
actual physical danger. Our ancestors survived because they were able to become 
anxious when confronted with danger (e.g., a hungry tiger), which motivated 
them to fight or to get out of the situation.” 
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o “If you were to walk across the street and a bus were coming at you, you 
would experience a strong surge of anxiety that would motivate you to get out 
of the situation, and this would be seen as completely normal.” 
o “The problem is that our brains sometimes have trouble separating social 
danger from physical danger. In public speaking situations, even though we 
are not in physical danger and therefore don’t need to fight or flee, the fight-
or-flight response sometimes gets activated anyway.  The response is reflected 
in a whole range of reactions, including increased physical arousal such as 
increased heart rate, faster breathing, sweating, etc.  We also tend to become 
hyper-aware of these bodily reactions.” 
o “It is our beliefs, and the thoughts associated with those beliefs, that trigger 
the fight or flight response.  If we didn’t perceive a public speaking situation 
as somehow dangerous, our brain wouldn’t generate the fight-or-flight 
response, and we wouldn’t feel anxious.  So the key to controlling anxiety is 
to make sure that you do not exaggerate the danger of the situation; that your 
thoughts remain realistic.” 
 
Introduce concept of exposure (5 minutes) 
 
• “’Exposure’ refers to confronting situations that you fear (in this case, public 
speaking situations).” 
• ASK: “Why do you think exposure is important?” – elicit from participant 
o “Help you challenge your thoughts and beliefs about yourself” 
§ (this is the most important point) 
§ “By putting yourself in a public speaking situation, we can determine 
the way your mind is thinking, which will then allow us  to distinguish 
inaccurate from accurate thoughts, and work to bring the inaccurate 
ones more in line with reality.” 
§ “Thus, exposures help us activate these thoughts so that we can 
evaluate their accuracy and correct them if needed.” 
o “Exposures also afford the opportunity to practice talking and giving a speech 
while using the anxiety reducing skills that you will learn today.” 
o “Exposures allow us to practice public speaking in a safe environment. This 
will serve to improve your skills while making it easier to speak while others 
are watching.” 
 
Treatment – Intro to the cognitive model (5 min) 
 
§ “Before we start these exposure exercises and the process of examining your 
thoughts, I’d like to take some time to explain some of the theory behind the 
anxiety reduction strategies we’ll be discussing.” 
§ “In any given situation you find yourself in – driving a car, having a conversation, 
watching TV, etc. – you are responding to the situation somehow. You may be 
happy, mad, indifferent, interested, bored, or critical; there are an infinite number 
of ways to respond. However, the situation itself isn’t directly causing your 
response.  Rather, how you think about the situation is what determines how you 
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respond. So if two people have two different thoughts about the same situation, 
they will respond with different emotions.” 
o “For example, if one person is driving out West and sees a tumbleweed pass 
over the road, he or she may think, “oh, a tumbleweed can’t hurt me”, and his 
or her response would be to keep on driving through the minor roadblock. On 
the other hand, another person may see the same tumbleweed and think, “that 
thing is going to kill me!” and therefore become overwhelmed with anxiety, 
perhaps even swerving off the road to miss the object. “ 
o “Another example may be standing up in a room full of people to give a toast. 
One individual might think, “I don’t have much to say, and I’m not the best 
speaker in the world but I can at least express how happy I am to be here.” 
That person would probably be able to give a toast without much trouble. 
However, a different person in the same situation may think, “I don’t have 
much to say and everybody is going to wonder why I’m even trying to give 
this toast.  I’m going to make a fool of myself.”  That individual would clearly 
become quite anxious, and would have a much harder time giving the speech. 
So, the thoughts we have about specific situations, rather than the situations 
themselves, elicit our emotional and behavioral response.” 
o “We are always going to have these so-called “automatic thoughts” in 
response to all situations – our mind is constantly running. However, just 
because we have these thoughts doesn’t make them true.  In fact, we have 
biases preprogrammed in our mind such that we often tend to see danger even 
when there isn’t any.” 
o “If we can take some of these biased, inaccurate thoughts, and restructure 
them to be more accurate, your emotional response will change as well. “ 
**15-minute time check** 
1. Finding Automatic Thoughts (10 minutes) 
 
• “Let’s take some time to discuss what these automatic thoughts look like.”  
• “Automatic thoughts are discrete, specific thoughts that occur in reaction to 
specific situations.  It’s sort of like your mind giving a running commentary on 
your ongoing experience.  For example, if you’re walking down a city street, you 
may have random thoughts such as “It’s cold out today.  That creepy person is 
staring at me.  I need to buy milk on the way home.  That person looks like my 
neighbor Cindy.” 
• “There are two important things to appreciate about automatic thoughts.  First, 
they typically occur just outside of awareness.  That is, we are typically unaware 
of them until we start paying close attention.  Because they are typically outside 
of our conscious awareness, our mind generally treats them as facts, rather than as 
hypotheses (guesses) that may or may not be true.” 
• “Second, although not all automatic thoughts are negative, the ones that cause 
anxiety are quite negative. As we discussed before, these thoughts typically 
exaggerate both the probability and cost of negative outcomes.” 
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o ASK:  “Can you give me an example of an automatic thought you had in the 
last 30 seconds” (doesn’t have to be about anxiety; and you can refine and re-
explain as necessary)?  
o  ASK:  “Now, imagine you are about to give a speech to a large group of 
people. There are about 40 people sitting in chairs a small room. You are at 
the front of the room, and the center of attention. They are all looking at you, 
expecting you to explain something to them. Can you give me an example of 
an automatic thought you would have when you find yourself about to speak?” 
(examples: everyone will think I’m stupid, everyone will talk about me) 
§ Elicit one AT -  
§ “This is a major part of the rationale for this treatment – thoughts are 
happening all of the time, we’re not even capable of paying attention 
to them all – but they still affect the way we feel and the way we 
respond whether or not we’re aware of them.” 
§ “So we’re going to pay attention more systematically to your 
automatic thoughts during the next hour, and then learn how to 
evaluate if they are distorted, and to correct them.” 
• “For public speaking anxiety, the negative automatic thoughts tend to be about 
how groups of people may evaluate us when we are the center of attention. Think 
back to a speech you remember clearly – it could be the one you did a few 
minutes ago here, or another one. It’s up to you – but pick one you remember well” 
–(Use the situationsàthoughtsàreactions flowchart) 
o ASK: “Let’s start by factually recording this situation. Tell me about what 
happened.” 
§ Record under “situation” 
§ May have to teach how to define situation without emotion, 
separate from responses and thoughts. 
o ASK: “How did you react to this situation?”  
§ Record under “response.”  Make sure to highlight emotions, 
although can also note behaviors. 
§ Help with questions like “when was your reaction the strongest?” 
“What was your physical state?” “What was your emotional 
state?” 
o ASK: “Why do you think this situation produced these reactions?” 
§ Try to foster acknowledgement that the thoughts they were having 
drive the response - “What was going through you mind?” 
§ Elicit responses like “I was worried my mind would go blank.” “I 
thought everyone was looking at me.” “I’m humiliating myself.” 
“Things will end badly,” etc. 
§ Use downward arrow technique as needed to elicit the core 
cognition(s) driving the emotional reaction – what’s the worst 
thing about this? If this is true, what does it mean? 
§ Record under “thoughts” 
§ Note:  If having trouble finding thoughts – can work backwards “so 
you thought you were doing a great job?” no? why not? 
2 Exposures – Two, 2-minute behavior experiments (10 minutes) 
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• “I’m going to ask you to stand up and give a two-minute speech on your favorite 
foods. I will let you know when to stop”  
• Both exposures will be on this same topic 
• Pick a single behavioral AT on which to focus (ideally – “I won’t have anything 
to say,” but also “I will turn red,” “I will look nervous,” etc.).  For this exercise, 
try to avoid thoughts that hinge on others’ subjective reactions (e.g., “They’ll 
think I look/sound stupid”), as these are harder to challenge with the data 
generated via this exercise. Note the AT on a blackboard, notepad, etc. 
• Did the feared outcome really happen? Discuss with participant 
• Repeat with a different AT 
• The “take-way” point of the exercise is that the negative, catastrophic thoughts 
were not accurate predictions of what would happen during the speech.  Instead, 
it simply led to anxiety.  So, we need to “restructure” the negative thought to 
something more realistic. 
 
**35 minute time-check** 
 
2. Restructuring Cognitive Distortions (15-20 minutes) 
• “As the exercise we just did illustrated, just because someone has a thought does 
not make it true.” 
o “Example: Just because you have the thought that that “everyone in this 
room thinks I’m incompetent,” doesn’t make it the truth”  
• “Therefore, we cannot just assume our thoughts are true, especially because they 
are so programmed to find danger and are heavily influenced by our past 
experiences and past thoughts. We must look for evidence.” 
•  “Let’s take one of the thoughts that we listed earlier and examine the evidence”  
o ASK: “Which one would you like to start with?” – be sure to make the 
thought as specific as possible – e..g. “my face will be red” – how red? – 
notice extremes.  
o Help the client evaluate the evidence for/against the thought, with an eye 
toward showing how it involves exaggerated probability and/or cost of 
negative outcomes.  As much as possible, assume a “neutral” stance 
through this process, using Socratic questioning to allow the client to 
draw his/her own conclusions based on his/her own experiences.  For 
example, “OK, so what’s so awful about turning red? Are there other 
reasons you could be red? What do you think the likelihood is that 
someone notices you are red? And if someone did notice you were red, 
what conclusions do you think they would draw from that?  When you 
notice someone blushing in a public speaking situation, what conclusions 
do you draw?  Do you think they’re ‘stupid’ or ‘incompetent?’  Or do you 
simply see it as a natural reaction when speaking in front of others?” 
• “Now that we see how the thought is distorted, the next step is to correct the 
distortion by coming up with a “rational” thought that better reflects reality.  Once 
we have identified this new thought, you can then focus on it while actually in the 
public speaking situation.” 
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o “For example, if you have the thought “I’m turning red!  Everyone will 
notice”, what is a more rational or accurate view of reality?” (Allow them to 
respond, help if necessary – elicit something like:  “Even if I do blush, and 
even if some people notice, it’s really not a big deal.  Blushing is completely 
normal when speaking in front of a group, and it’s unlikely that anyone would 
judge me negatively for it.  And besides, even if someone did, that’s their 
problem.”) 
o “What if you have the thought “When they notice, they’ll think I’m an idiot”?” 
(similarly, wait for them/help to elicit a more rational and realistic response) 
 
** Exposure – Two, 2-minute speeches practicing focusing on a corrected AT – both 
times for this restructured AT (10 Minutes) 
• Use the central AT restructured per above; write it down on a blackboard, dry-
erase board, etc. 
• “Please stand up and give a two-minute speech on what you would do if you won 
the lottery. Every 30 seconds, I’m going to ask for a SUDS rating and ask you to 
read the rational response written on this dry erase board. Then, immediately 
continue your speech again from where you left off” –  
• Repeat this exposure and instructions TWICE, with the second speech on a 
current political/controversial issue of their choice. 
• Immediately following the exercise, the therapist and patient discuss the evidence 
gathered during the exercise – be sure to include both evidence for the AT and 
evidence that contradicts the AT.   
 
** Exposure – Two, 2-minute speeches practicing focusing on another corrected AT – 
both times for this restructured AT (10 Minutes) 
• Take time to restructure another thought, and repeat exposure activity as 
described above. 
• “Please stand up and give another two-minute speech on your favorite book or 
TV show. Again, every 30 seconds, I’m going to ask for a SUDS rating and ask 
you to read this new rational response written on this dry erase board. Then, 
immediately continue your speech again from where you left off” –  
• Repeat this exposure and instructions TWICE, with the second speech on a 
description of their immediate family. 
• Immediately following the exercise, the therapist and patient conduct a brief 
“postmortem” of the exercise, discussing topics such as the evidence gathered 
during the exercise that supports and contradicts the AT, etc.   
 
o Take home messages to review (2 minutes) 
• “Anxiety is a natural reaction to danger” 
• “Our thoughts and beliefs about the dangerousness of situations that really aren’t 
dangerous cause anxiety.  Situations themselves don’t cause anxiety; our thoughts 
about them do.” 
• “Our mind is constantly making a running commentary on the world, which we 
call “automatic thoughts.”  We are typically unaware of these thoughts, but we 
can become aware of them by paying close attention.” 
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• “Automatic thoughts are not necessarily true, and in fact are often distorted.  Just 
because we have a thought in no way means that it is a valid reflection of reality.” 
• “Anxiety related automatic thoughts tend to reflect two themes (or “biases”):  the 
exaggerated likelihood of a negative outcome, and the exaggerated 
cost/consequences should that outcome actually happen.” 
• “To reduce anxiety, we need to become aware of our ATs, and correct them so 
that they are more realistic.  It’s often helpful to do this before giving a speech, 
anticipating the type of thought you’re likely to have.” 
• “During a speech it’s helpful to focus on the corrected, rational thought.  This will 
help control excessive anxiety, thereby making it easier to give the speech.” 
 
** 2 Exposures – Two final 2-minute speeches incorporating all of the learned skills. (10 
minutes 
• ““Please stand up and give another two-minute speech on your favorite holiday. 
Try to incorporate the strategies we’ve discussed today – when you notice 
yourself having anxious and negative thoughts, remember the corrected, rational 
thought and continue your speech.” –  
• Repeat this exposure and instructions TWICE, with the second speech on their 
favorite job and/or class in school 
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Age: _______   Year of Birth: __________________  
 
 
Gender (circle one): Male   or Female 
 
 
Employment status:  
 
(0)           full-time             (1)           part-time          (2)           occasional/per diem 
 
 






Student status (if applicable): (0)  full-time          (1)  part-time 
 
 
Student type (if applicable):   (0)  undergraduate (1)  graduate 
 
 
Marital/relationship status:  
 
(0)  single (no current romantic partner)  
 
(1)  married  
 
(2)  living with partner (not married)  
 
(3)  not living with current partner  
 
(4)  divorced  
 





Ethnicity (check all that apply):  
	  129	  
 
(0)  African American / Black  
 
(1)  Caribbean / Haitian  
 
(2)   African 
 
(3)   Asian American  
 
(4)   Asian / Pacific-Islander  
 
(5)   White / European American / Caucasian  
 
(6)   European  
 
(7)   Latino/Latina / Hispanic American / Hispanic  
 
(8)   Native American / American Indian  
 





Is English your first language? (0)  Yes  (1)  No; I learned starting at age: ____ 
 
 
Have you been in counseling/therapy before? If so, please indicate date(s) and a brief 
description of treatment (including reason for treatment). Also indicate any medications 










Clinical Global Impression – Severity Scale (CGI-S) 
 
 
Severity of illness 
 
Considering your total clinical experience with this particular population, how mentally 
ill is the patient at this time? 
 
 
0 = Not assessed  
1 = Normal, not at all ill  
2 = Borderline mentally ill  
3 = Mildly ill  
4 = Moderately ill 
5 = Markedly ill 
6 = Severely ill 
7 = Among the most extremely ill patients 
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Subjective Units of Discomfort Scale (SUDS) 
 
 
SUDS: Subjective Units of Discomfort Scale: 
 
0 – no anxiety, calm  
 
25 – mild anxiety, able to cope  
 
50 – moderate anxiety, some trouble focusing  
 
75 – severe anxiety, thoughts of leaving situation  
 
100 – very severe anxiety, worst ever experienced 
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Speech Performance Scale (SPS) 
 
We would like you to rate the speaker you just heard on the features listed below. For each 
feature, please circle the appropriate number to indicate how you felt they rated. Your 
evaluation will remain confidential. 
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State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – State Scale (STAI-S) 
 
 DIRECTIONS:  A number of statements which people used to describe themselves are 
given below.  Read each statement and then blacken in the appropriate circle to the right of 
the statement to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this moment.  There are no right 
or wrong answers.  Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer 
which seems to describe your present feelings best.   
 
  Not at All Somewhat Moderately Very 
Much So 
1. I feel calm 1 1 1 1 
2. I feel secure 1 1 1 1 
3. I am tense 1 1 1 1 
4. I feel strained 1 1 1 1 
5. I feel at ease 1 1 1 1 
6. I feel upset 1 1 1 1 
7. I am presently worrying over possible 
misfortunes 
 
1 1 1 1 
8. I feel satisfied 1 1 1 1 
9. I feel frightened 1 1 1 1 
10
. 
I feel comfortable 1 1 1 1 
11
. 
I feel self-confident 1 1 1 1 
12
. 
I feel nervous 1 1 1 1 
13
. 
I feel jittery 1 1 1 1 
14
. 
I feel indecisive 1 1 1 1 
15
. 
I am relaxed 1 1 1 1 
16
. 
I feel content 1 1 1 1 
17
. 
I am worried 1 1 1 1 
18
. 
I feel confused 1 1 1 1 
19
. 
I feel steady 1 1 1 1 
20
. 
I feel pleasant 1 1 1 1 
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Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker (PRCS) 
 
Instructions: This instrument is composed of 12 items regarding your feelings of 
confidence as a speaker. Decide whether “true” or “false” most represents your feelings 
associated with public speaking. Work quickly and don’t spend too much time on any 
one question; we want your first impression.  
 
 
1. My hands tremble when I try to handle objects on the platform 
TRUE   FALSE 
 
2. I am in constant fear of forgetting my speech 
TRUE   FALSE 
 
3. While preparing a speech I am in a constant state of anxiety 
TRUE   FALSE 
 
4. My thoughts become confused and jumbled when I speak before an audience 
TRUE   FALSE 
 
5. Although I talk fluently with friends I am at a loss for words on the platform 
TRUE   FALSE 
 
6. The faces of my audience are blurred when I look at them 
TRUE   FALSE 
 
7. I feel disgusted with myself after trying to address a group of people 
TRUE   FALSE 
 
8. I perspire and tremble just before getting up to speak 
TRUE   FALSE 
 
9. My posture feels strained and unnatural 
TRUE   FALSE 
 
10. I am fearful and tense all the while I am speaking before a group of people 
TRUE   FALSE 
 
11. It is difficult for me to search my mind calmly for the right words to express my 
thoughts 
TRUE   FALSE 
 
12. I am terrified at the thought of speaking before a group of people  
TRUE   FALSE 
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Self-Statements During Public Speaking (SSPS) 
 
Self-Statements During Public Speaking (SSPS)  
Please imagine what you have typically felt and thought to yourself during any kind of 
public speaking situations.  Imagining these situations, how much do you agree with the 
statements given below.  Please rate the degree of your agreement on a scale between 0 
(if you do not agree at all) to 5 (if you agree extremely with the statement).   
 
 
1. What do I have to lose; it’s worth a try  
0  1  2  3  4  5 
 
2. I’m a loser  
0  1  2  3  4  5 
 
3. This is an awkward situation but I can handle it  
 0  1  2  3  4  5 
 
4. A failure in this situation would be more proof of my incapacity  
 0  1  2  3  4  5 
 
5. Even if things don’t go well, it’s no catastrophe  
 0  1  2  3  4  5 
 
6. I can handle everything  
 0  1  2  3  4  5 
 
7. What I say will probably sound stupid  
 0  1  2  3  4  5 
 
8. I’ll probably “bomb out” anyway  
 0  1  2  3  4  5 
 
9. Instead of worrying I could concentrate on what I want to say  
 0  1  2  3  4  5 
 
10. I feel awkward and dumb; they’re bound to notice   
  0  1  2  3  4  5 
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DIRECTIONS: This instrument is composed of 6 statements concerning your feelings 
about public speaking. Please indicate the degree to which each statement applies to you 
by marking whether you (1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) are undecided, (4) disagree, or 
























_____ 6. When giving a speech, I get so nervous I forget facts I really know. 
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Drexel Defusion Scale 
 
Defusion is a term used by psychologists to describe a state of achieving distance from internal 
experiences such as thoughts and feelings.  Suppose you put your hands over your face and 
someone asks you, “What do hands look like?”  You might answer, “They are all dark.”  If you 
held your hands out a few inches away, you might add, “they have fingers and lines in them.” In a 
similar way, getting some distance from your thoughts allows you to see them for what they are.  
The point is to notice the process of thinking as it happens rather than only noticing the results of 
that process, in other words, your thoughts.  When you think a thought, it “colors” your world.  
When you see a thought from a distance, you can still see how it “colors” your world (you 
understand what it means), but you also see that you are doing the “coloring.”  It would be as if 
you always wore yellow sunglasses and forgot you were wearing them.  Defusion is like taking 
off your glasses and holding them several inches away from your face; then you can see how they 
make the world appear to be yellow instead of only seeing the yellow world. 
 
Similarly, when you are defused from an emotion you can see yourself having the emotion, rather 
than simply being in it.  When you are defused from a craving or a sensation of pain, you don’t 
just experience the craving or pain, you see yourself having them.  Defusion allows you to see 
thoughts, feelings, cravings, and pain as simply processes taking place in your brain.  The more 
defused you are from thoughts or feelings, the less automatically you act on them. 
 
For example, you may do something embarrassing and have the thought “I’m such an idiot.”  If 
you are able to defuse from this thought, you will be able to see it as just a thought.  In other 
words you can see that the thought is something in your mind that may or may not be true.  If you 
are not able to defuse, you would take the thought as literally true, and your feelings and actions 
would automatically be impacted by the thought. 
 
Based on the definition of defusion above, please rate each scenario according to the 
extent to which you would normally be in a state of defusion in the specified 
situation.  You may want to read through all the examples before beginning to respond to 
the questions.  (Important: you are not being asked about the degree to which you would 
think certain thoughts or feel a certain way, but the degree to which you would defuse if 
you did.) 
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
N








uite a lot 
Very m
uch 
1  Feelings of Anger.  You become angry when someone takes your place in a long line.  To what extent would you normally be able to defuse from feelings of anger?        
2  Cravings for Food.  You see your favorite food and have the urge to eat it.  To what extent would you normally be able to defuse from cravings for food?       
3  Physical Pain.  Imagine that you bang your knee on a table leg.  To what extent would you normally be able to defuse from physical pain?       
4  
Anxious Thoughts.  Things have not been going well at school or at your job, and 
work just keeps piling up.  To what extent would you normally be able to defuse from 
anxious thoughts like “I’ll never get this done.”? 
      
5  
Thoughts of self.  Imagine you are having a thought such as “no one likes me.”  To 
what extent would you normally be able to defuse from negative thoughts about 
yourself? 
      
6  
Thoughts of Hopelessness.  You are feeling sad and stuck in a difficult situation that 
has no obvious end in sight.  You experience thoughts such as “Things will never get 
any better.”  To what extent would you normally be able to defuse from thoughts of 
hopelessness? 
      
	  138	  
7  
Thoughts about motivation or ability.  Imagine you are having a thought such as “I 
can’t do this” or “I just can’t get started.”  To what extent would you normally be able 
to defuse from thoughts about motivation or ability? 
      
8  
Thoughts about Your Future.  Imagine you are having thoughts like, “I’ll never 
make it” or “I have no future.”  To what extent would you normally be able to defuse 
from thoughts about your future? 
      
9  
Sensations of Fear.  You are about to give a presentation to a large group. As you sit 
waiting your turn, you start to notice your heart racing, butterflies in your stomach, and 
your hands trembling.  To what extent would you normally be able to defuse from 
sensations of fear? 
      
10 
Feelings of Sadness.  Imagine that you lose out on something you really wanted.  You 
have feelings of sadness.  To what extent would you normally be able to defuse from 
feelings of sadness? 
      
11 
Anxiety About Group Social Situations. You are preparing to go to a party and 
experience thoughts such as "I won't make a good impression" and "I won't be able to 
start and maintain conversations." To what extent would you normally be able to 
defuse from anxious thoughts about a group social situation? 
      
12 
Anxiety About One-on-One Interpersonal Situations. You find yourself alone with 
a coworker or classmate whom you don't know well. This person says hello, and looks 
as if he or she want to talk. You experience thoughts such as "I won't have anything to 
say" and symptoms of anxiety such as a racing heart and flushing.  To what extent 
would you normally be able to defuse from such anxious thoughts and feelings in one-
on-one interpersonal situations? 
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Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale 
 
Instructions: Please indicate how often you experienced each of the following statements 
within the past week: 
 
  1   2   3   4   5  
              Never        Rarely            Sometimes        Often        Very Often 
 
1. I am aware of what thoughts are passing through my mind. 
 
2. I try to distract myself when I feel unpleasant emotions. 
 
3. When talking with other people, I am aware of their facial and body expressions. 
 
4. There are aspects of myself I don’t want to think about. 
 
5. When I shower, I am aware of how the water is running over my body. 
 
6. I try to stay busy to keep thoughts or feelings from coming to mind. 
 
7. When I am startled, I notice what is going on inside my body. 
 
8. I wish I could control my emotions more easily. 
 
9. When I walk outside, I am aware of smells or how the air feels against my face. 
 
10. I tell myself that I shouldn’t have certain thoughts. 
 
11. When someone asks how I am feeling, I can identify my emotions easily. 
 
12. There are things I try not to think about. 
 
13. I am aware of thoughts I’m having when my mood changes. 
 
14. I tell myself that I shouldn’t feel sad. 
 
15. I notice changes inside my body, like my heart beating faster or my muscles getting  
      tense. 
 
16. If there is something I don’t want to think about, I’ll try many things to get it out of  
      my mind. 
 
17. Whenever my emotions change, I am conscious of them immediately.  
 
18. I try to put my problems out of mind.  
 
19. When talking with other people, I am aware of the emotions I am experiencing.  
 
20. When I have a bad memory, I try to distract myself to make it go away. 
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Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II) 
 
Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate how true each statement is for you by 
circling a number next to it. Use the scale below to make your choice.   
 


















              
1. Its OK if I remember something unpleasant.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. My painful experiences and memories make it 
difficult for me to live a life that I would value.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I’m afraid of my feelings.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I worry about not being able to control my 
worries and feelings.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. My painful memories prevent me from having a 
fulfilling life.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I am in control of my life.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Emotions cause problems in my life.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. It seems like most people are handling their lives 
better than I am.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Worries get in the way of my success.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. My thoughts and feelings do not get in the way 
of how I want to live my life.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Reaction to Treatment Questionnaire (RTQ) 
 
Subject # (Staff use only): ________________ 
 
On a scale of 1 (low) to 10 (high), please rate your reaction to your experience of 
treatment so far.  Indicate your rating by circling the appropriate number. 
 
1. How logical does this type of treatment seem to you? 
 
1     2         3       4       5       6       7       8        9              10 
Not                             Very  
Logical                                       Logical 
 
2. How confident are you that this treatment will be successful in eliminating your 
fear of public speaking? 
 
1     2         3       4       5       6       7       8        9              10 
Not at all                       Very  
Confident                               Confident 
 
3. How confident would you be in recommending this treatment to a friend who was 
extremely anxious about public speaking? 
 
1     2         3       4       5       6       7       8        9              10 
Not at all                         Very  
confident                               confident 
 
4. How successful do you feel this treatment would be in decreasing different fears? 
 
1     2         3       4       5       6       7       8        9              10 
Not at all                         Very  
successful                              successful 
 
5. How confident are you that this treatment could eliminate fear of giving a speech? 
 
1     2         3       4       5       6       7       8        9              10 
Not at all                            Very  
confident                              confident 
 
6. How severe is your fear of public speaking now? 
 
1     2         3       4       5       6       7       8        9              10 
Not at all                      Very         




7. How severe do you expect your fear of public speaking to be immediately 
following treatment? 
 
1     2         3       4       5       6       7       8        9              10 
Not at all                        Very         
severe                            severe 
 
8. How severe do you expect your fear of public speaking to be: 
 
a. One year after treatment? 
 
1     2         3       4       5       6       7       8        9              10 
Not at all                            Very        
severe                            severe 
 
b. Five years after treatment? 
 
1     2         3       4       5       6       7       8        9              10 
Not at all                             Very       
  




Social Life Scale 
 
On a scale of 1 – 7, please rate how familiar you are with the social opportunities 
organized through your work or school: (1 = not familiar at all, 7 = extremely familiar) 
 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    
7 
              Not                 Know of Some Things               Know About 
Many 





On a scale of 1 – 7, please rate how familiar you are with social organizations in the 
Philadelphia area: (1 = not familiar at all, 7 = extremely familiar) 
 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    
7 
               Not                        Know of Some                  Know About 
Many 
Familiar With Any                      
 
 
On a scale of 1 – 7, please rate how familiar you are with things to do in the Philadelphia 
area: (1 = not familiar at all, 7 = extremely familiar) 
 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    
7 
               Not                 Know of Some Things               Know About 
Many 






Treatment Fidelity Form 
 
1. How useful did you find the anxiety management strategies that you were 
instructed to apply to your final speech exposure? (0 = not useful at all, 10 = 
extremely useful) 
 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    
7 
           Not        Somewhat                        Extremely  
         Useful            Useful                                     Useful 
                                    
 
 
2. How much did you use or apply the given anxiety measurement strategies while 
undergoing your final speech exposure? (0 = did not use, 10 = used a lot) 
 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    
7 
        Did Not    Used Occasionally              Used  













4. Which strategy did you find most effective or helpful? 
 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
________________  
 
 
 
